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Abstract 
 
This thesis shows that taxes are frequently a foe but also an ally of competition. 
Traditionally, both the legal doctrine and economic theory see taxes as an obstacle to 
competition. The imposition of a tax affects the supply and demand and therefore 
interferes with the normal balance of the market. Custom duties and tax aids are basic 
examples of how taxes can restrict competition. In the European context, the lack of tax 
coordination in the internal market is another factor that contributes to distort 
competition considering that it obliges European firms to compete under different rules 
and involves high compliance costs. These and other situations where taxes affect 
competition will be analysed in this study. 
 Despite of the obstacles that taxes often represent to competition, the author 
believes that taxes must also be regarded as an ally to the extent that they can foster 
competition as well as be used to correct serious market failures, some of the most 
important purposes of competition policy. That is the case e.g., of taxes that foster 
competition in monopolistic markets, patent boxes and even environmental taxes. 
Through these and other examples the author will try to sustain that the negative and the 
positive effects that taxes have on competition are two sides of the same coin. 
As taxes are more often a foe than an ally, it is necessary from a competition 
policy perspective to eradicate the obstacles that taxes create for competition. Therefore 
in this work the author contributes with a list of recommendations for the EU 
policymakers, hoping that in the future they will be reflected in European tax law. 
 
Keywords: Distortions of competition, unfair competition, tax aid, tax coordination, 
market failures. 
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Resumo 
 
 Esta tese demonstra que os impostos são frequentemente um inimigo, mas 
também um aliado da concorrência. Tradicionalmente, não só a doutrina jurídica mas 
também a teoria económica, vêm os impostos como um obstáculo à concorrência. A 
imposição de um imposto interfere com o normal funcionamento do mercado, afectanto 
a oferta e a procura, uma vez que aumenta os preços do mercado. Impostos 
alfandegários e auxílios fiscais são exemplos básicos de como os impostos podem 
restringir a concorrência. No contexto Europeu, a falta de coordenação fiscal no 
mercado interno é outro factor que contribui para a distorção da concorrência, 
considerando que obriga as empresas europeias a competir sob diferentes regras e 
envolve elevados custos de cumprimento. Estas  e outras situações em que os impostos 
afectam a concorrência serão analisados neste estudo. 
Apesar dos obstáculos que os impostos frequentemente representam para a 
concorrência, o autor acredita que os impostos devem também ser considerados um 
aliado, na medida em que eles podem fomentar a concorrência, assim como ser 
utilizados para corrigir graves falhas de mercado, alguns dos principais objectivos da 
política da concorrência. Esse é o caso, por exemplo, de impostos que fomentam 
concorrência em mercados monopolistas, regimes fiscais próprios para direitos de 
propriedade intelectual e até mesmo impostos ambientais. Através destes e de outros 
exemplos, o autor irá tentar sustentar que os efeitos negativos e positivos que os 
impostos têm na concorrência são dois lados da mesma moeda.  
Uma vez que os impostos são mais frequentemente um inimigo do que um 
aliado, é necessário, de uma perspectiva da política da concorrência, eliminar os 
obstáculos que os impostos criam para a concorrência. Portanto, neste trabalho o autor 
contribui com uma lista de recomendações para os decisores políticos da UE, na 
expectativa de que no futuro elas estejam reflectidas no direito fiscal europeu. 
 
Palavras-chave: Distorções da concorência, concorrência desleal, auxílio fiscal, 
coordenação fiscal, falhas de mercado.  
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Introduction 
 
 Initially, it should be noted that this essay was written with the purpose of the 
completion of the LL.M. in European and Transglobal Business Law. This is a very 
comprehensive programme which has tax law, competition law and international trade 
law as some of its main fields of studies. As a result, this work is also very 
comprehensive, not having its scope limited to tax or competition law issues. The author 
will seek to identify key situations in the European context where taxes have a negative 
and a positive impact on competition. Thus, the scope of this study is intentionally 
broad. 
The main purpose of this thesis is to show that taxes are frequently a foe but also 
an ally of competition. Traditionally, not only the legal doctrine but also the economic 
theory sees taxes as an obstacle to competition. The imposition of a tax whether on 
production or on consumption interferes with the normal balance of the market, 
affecting the supply and demand as it raises prices on the market.
1
 Furthermore, 
transfers of financial resources from market actors to the State and vice versa always 
open doors for distortions of competition. Thus, taxes affect the natural allocation of 
financial resources in the market and there is the possibility that they affect it in an 
inappropriate way from a public interest perspective.  
However, the fact that distortions of competition may occur whenever there is a 
transfer of financial resources from market actors to the State and vice versa does not 
necessarily mean that undue distortions will necessarily occur. Not denying that taxes 
frequently constitute a significant obstacle to competition, one cannot restrict the effects 
of taxes to their negative side. In spite of the obstacles that taxes often represent to 
competition, it is the author’s opinion that taxes must also be regarded as an ally, to the 
extent that they can foster competition as well as be used to protect the interest of all 
market participants and correct serious market failures. For instance, governments can 
make use of the tax system to foster competition in monopolistic markets, protecting all 
market participants from the harmful effects that such a market can originate and thus 
correcting a market failure.  
                                                          
1
 José Ribeiro Brazuna, “Defesa da Concorrência e Tributação - à luz do Artigo 146-A da Constituição”, 
in Instituto Brasileiro de Direito Tributário, Quartier Latin, 2009, page 43. 
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Therefore, the author sustains that the negative and the positive effects that taxes 
have on competition are two sides of the same coin. Whereas in some cases taxes are a 
foe of competition, in other cases they function as a true ally. Throughout this piece of 
research the author will resort to practical examples to give consistency to the approach 
adopted. 
As the OECD notes, “[t]he actual impact of [tax] state aids and subsidies is 
difficult to assess. On one hand, they may cause distortions and inefficiencies. On the 
other hand they are frequently rationalised as an instrument to tackle market failures and 
to produce positive externalities” (emphasis added).2 The assessment of whether the 
impact of taxes on competition is positive or negative will ultimately depend on the 
delimitation of the main purposes of competition law. If we consider that the protection 
of the free market per se is the main goal of competition law, we will easily find 
situations where taxes have a negative impact on competition. Conversely, if we 
consider that the ultimate purpose of competition law is the protection of all market 
participants (producers, distributers, sellers, consumers and ultimately the society) and 
that the protection of the free market is just a mean to achieve a superior end (the 
society welfare) taxes will more often be considered an ally of competition. The author 
tends towards the latter approach. 
Even though this is a topic with relevance at WTO level, this study will be 
limited to the European context. The legal framework in the European Union regarding 
taxes and competition is very peculiar and provides an excellent theoretical basis to 
launch a pertinent debate. Irrespectively of what we consider to be the ultimate goal of 
competition law, the lack of tax coordination prevailing in the EU cannot let to be 
considered a major factor responsible for distorting competition in the internal market. 
Companies exercising activities in the same single market are treated differently 
according to the location of their headquarters, which results in unfair competition. 
Furthermore, the lack of tax coordination involves high compliance costs for companies 
exercising activities throughout the internal market, which makes them less competitive, 
efficient and innovative. As a consequence, we will fundamentally focus on the 
problems that the legal status quo in the European Union regarding taxes entails for 
competition. Nevertheless, the fact that this work is limited to the European context 
                                                          
2
 OECD, “Competition, State Aid, and Subsidies”, Competition Policy Roundtables, 2010. 
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does not preclude the possibility of making sporadic references to other regimes like the 
WTO, OECD and EFTA when convenient.  
 
Delimitations 
 
Once more, this is intentionally a comprehensive work and has points of 
connection with several fields of law besides tax law, so it is convenient to delimitate its 
scope from the beginning. This piece of research is centred on the impact of taxes on 
competition. Thus, it deals only with distortive measures that have a tax nature. 
Furthermore, the scope of this study is limited to the European legal context and not to 
the international context. 
Tax aids granted by States can have a significant impact on competition and for 
that reason will assume particular relevance in this piece of research. State aid is 
therefore the area of EU competition law that is of most interest for this piece of 
research. Within the innumerable forms of state aid, tax aids are the only ones relevant. 
State aids that do not have a tax nature (e.g. direct subsidies or loan agreements) are 
excluded from the scope of this thesis. 
Naturally, the traditional areas of competition law (cartels, abuse of dominant 
position and mergers and acquisitions) are also excluded from the scope of this work. 
One section is dedicated to the discussion of some issues related to the abuse of 
dominant position, but that section is not based in the traditional analysis of Article 102 
of the TFEU. Instead, it presents an analysis of how taxes can contribute to increase 
competition in monopolistic markets.  
Another field of law that is related with this topic is international trade law. 
International trade law deals with several issues that can affect competition, such as 
custom duties, subsidies (in the broad concept of the WTO) and quantitative 
restrictions. Only custom duties and subsidies, however, will deserve special emphasis 
throughout this study as these are the ones that have a tax nature.  
As the scope of this study is limited to the analysis of the European legal status 
quo, the international regime of the WTO is also generally excluded. There will be some 
references to the WTO rules but only because there are some points of contact between 
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such rules and the European state aid control. Thus, the international rules of the WTO 
will never be the central object of analysis of this essay. 
Finally, it is important to note that this topic goes beyond the legal arena in the 
sense that it has considerable importance for certain areas of economics, such as, public 
economics, economic integration theory and international trade theory.
3
 Albeit this 
academic work also includes an economic approach, it is important to note that it does 
not look at financial calculations. 
 
Methodologies 
 
Regarding the methodologies adopted, this piece of research is essentially based 
on a legal dogmatic descriptive method, particularly Part I. The following Parts (II, III 
and IV) are the product of a legal dogmatic descriptive method together with an analytic 
approach where the author sought to give his opinion whenever it seemed appropriated. 
 
Structure 
 
Clarifying the operative concepts of the topic is of upmost importance before 
advancing to the analysis of the impact of taxes on competition in detail. Thus, Part I 
defines such concepts, which include the concept of tax adopted in this study, the 
definition of the EU competition law purposes, the concept of market failures, an 
overview of the state aid control and a description of the legal status quo in the 
European Union. The purpose of this Part is to provide the reader an indispensable 
background to understand the scope of the topic. 
Part II and Part III, the core parts of this research, provide factual elements that 
sustain the thesis i.e., taxes are often a foe but can also be an ally of competition. 
Whereas Part II discusses the negative effects of taxes on competition, Part III describes 
the positive effects. In both Parts specific situations of national tax systems as well as 
                                                          
3
 See Hans Friederiszick W., Lars-Hendrik Röller, and Vincent Verouden, “European State Aid Control: 
an economic framework“, Working Paper, 2006, available at 
https://www.esmt.org/fm/312/European_State_Aid_Control.pdf [02/04/2015], page 11. 
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situations that concern the European legal framework will be analysed. One can say 
from this moment that Part II is more extensive than Part III because the negative 
impact that taxes have on competition is much more palpable than the positive impact.  
In the last Part, Part IV, the author makes a critical analysis. As the negative 
impact that taxes have on competition is more noticeable than the positive impact, it 
would be important from a competition policy perspective to correct the obstacles that 
taxes frequently have on competition and emphasize their positive effects. Thus, the 
author will provide some recommendations in that sense throughout the fourth Part. 
This Part also includes the final conclusions of the essay. 
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PART I - GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE TOPIC 
 
1. Outline 
 
The main purpose of this first Part is to provide the reader an indispensable 
background to understand the topic. Before advancing to the analysis of the impact of 
taxes on competition properly said, it is necessary to clarify the operative concepts of 
the topic. 
The author will start by clarifying the concept of tax adopted in this piece of 
research, the types of taxes that will be under scrutiny, the taxes that will be set aside 
and the concept of tax benefits.  
The subsequent section defines the main purpose of EU competition law. In 
order to evaluate properly the impact of taxes on competition it is paramount to keep in 
mind the main purpose of EU competition law. Hence, in this introductory Part we will 
define the main purpose of EU competition law. 
In a third moment, the author will analyse the concept of market failures. States 
frequently charge taxes to correct market failures and thus satisfy the public interest. As 
this concept will be often invoked throughout this essay, it is important to clarify it in 
this first Part. 
The subsequent section describes the EU state aid control, because this is the 
best example of the main argument put forward in this thesis i.e., that taxes can have 
either a positive or a negative impact on competition. On one hand, the general 
prohibition of state aid established in Article 107(1) of the TFEU reflects that state aids, 
including tax aids, may affect competition. On the other hand, the exceptions to Article 
107(1)
4
 are the recognition that sporadically tax aids have positive effects that outweigh 
the negative effects, being those aids an ally of competition. As tax aids will deserve 
special emphasis during the course of this essay, in this introductory Part the author will 
indicate the reasons that justify the state aid control, describe the enforcement of this 
                                                          
4
 Foreseen in Article 107(2) and 107(3) of the TFEU. 
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regime and clarify the notion of state aid and of tax aid according to the legal doctrine 
and the ECJ case law. 
Finally, as one of the main purposes of this essay is to provide some suggestions 
to change the legal status quo in the EU regarding the impact of taxes on competition 
(task that is realised in Part IV), the last section of this first Part contains an 
indispensable description of that legal status quo, which demands a significant shift. 
 
2. Taxes Covered 
 
The concept of tax is very flexible and there is no universal definition of tax. 
Definitions tend to vary according to their context. The economic and legal notions of 
tax do not strictly coincide with each other. Equally, the concept of tax adopted in the 
US is not exactly the same that is used in large part of the EU Member States.
5
 So, it is 
important to clarify the concept of tax adopted in this essay from the beginning.  
The author follows the OECD working definition of a tax, which establishes that 
a tax is a “compulsory unrequited payment to the government”. Taxes are unrequited or 
unilateral inasmuch as there is no proportion between the tax paid and the benefits 
provided by the government to the taxpayer.
6
 In other words, there is nothing that the 
taxpayer receives directly in return of the tax payment (on the contrary of fees, where 
there is a direct link between the money paid and the good or service obtained). 
 One other useful definition of tax is the one provided by Thuronyi, which says 
that taxes can be defined as “a contribution unilaterally imposed under public law which 
serves to raise revenues and is payable to a public authority (…) [and] where the 
taxpayer does not receive anything in return for the payment” (emphasis added).7 Even 
though taxes are usually paid in cash it is important to note that some statutes foresee 
the possibility of payment in kind under certain circumstances. The fact that taxes are 
always imposed by law is a consequence of the principle of legality and means that 
taxes can only be collected if there is a statute lawfully enacted providing so. Moreover, 
taxes are always collected by a public authority and go directly to the State coffers so 
                                                          
5
 Victor Thuronyi, “Comparative Tax Law”, Kluwer Law International, 2003, page 48. 
6 European Association of Tax Law Professors, “The Concept of Tax in EU Member States”, page 20. 
7
 Victor Thuronyi, “Comparative Tax Law”, op. cit., pages 48 and 49. 
  25 
that public goals can be realised. Additionally, some taxes also take into consideration 
the taxpayer's ability to pay, a corollary of the equality principle. That is why the 
personal income tax is progressive. However, indirect taxes like the VAT are not 
progressive and so, it cannot be said that all taxes take into consideration the taxpayer's 
ability to pay. To finish, it is important to note that taxes do not have a criminal nature 
and so, they are not imposed by way of a penalty or a criminal fine.
8
 
There is also no universal classification of taxes. Taxes can be classified with 
reference to particular criteria. For instance, taxes can be classified by reference to the 
base on which the tax is levied (such as income, payroll or property), by reference to the 
method by which the tax is collected (such as, by way of a stamp, withholding, or 
assessment), or even by reference to whether they are direct or indirect.
9
 This panoply 
of classifications makes very difficult to indicate all the types of taxes that will be 
included and excluded in this piece of research.  
There will certainly be numerous references to direct and indirect taxes. From 
amongst the direct taxes, the corporate income tax (CIT) is the one that will deserve the 
most attention. Conversely, the personal income tax, the tax applied on individuals, will 
rarely be mentioned considering that this tax hardly has a significant impact on 
competition.  
Regarding indirect taxes the VAT, excise duties on gasoline, alcoholic 
beverages, tobacco, and motor vehicles, as well as registration duties will be part of the 
analysis made in this academic study. Custom duties, exit taxes collected from legal 
persons and environmental taxes will also be part of the analysis made.  
In spite of the difficulties of enumerating all the taxes that will be excluded from 
this piece of research there are some that, because of their scarce impact on competition, 
can be indicated as it is the case of the personal income tax, inheritance taxes and gift 
taxes. Property taxes and stamp duties will also not deserve a particular reference. In 
addition to these taxes, the ‘direct cousins’ of taxes, fees and social contributions, are 
also excluded from the analysis made in this academic work. 
                                                          
8
 IBFD, ‘International Tax Glossary’, Julie Rogers-Glabush, 6th Revised Edition, page 416. 
9
 Ibid. 
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One final concept that is essential to make clear from the beginning is the 
concept of tax benefit as this concept will be invoked very often throughout this 
dissertation. The concept of tax benefit covers any tax break granted by the government 
that relieves the normal tax obligations of the taxpayer, such as, tax exemptions, tax 
deferrals, tax credits and tax allowances.
10
 Tax benefits are usually granted to encourage 
the development of certain economic activities and they typically confer an economic 
advantage to their recipients. As it will be noted throughout this piece of research, tax 
benefits are highly susceptible of creating distortions of competition. 
 
3. The Purpose of EU Competition Law 
 
 3.1. The Protection of the European Citizen Welfare 
 
 One of the most important considerations that should be made in this first Part of 
the study is the definition of the main purpose of EU competition law. In order to 
correctly assess the situations where taxes act as a foe and as an ally of competition 
(which is made in Parts II and III), it is crucial to be aware of what is the main purpose 
of EU competition law.  
 It is possible to say that EU competition law has a plurality of purposes, namely, 
economic integration, the maintenance of a level playing field, fostering competition 
and innovation, safeguard the free market and the free initiative, correcting market 
failures, and the defence of all market participants (producers, distributers, sellers…), 
especially the European consumer.
11
 These are the most important purposes of 
competition law.  
 In spite of this plurality of purposes, one can and must define a hierarchy 
between them because they can be contradictory sometimes. For instance, one free 
market can be contradictory to the interest of the European consumer, or better, of the 
European citizen. 
                                                          
10
 Ibid. Page 430. 
11
 Luís Domingos Silva Morais, “Empresas Comuns – Joint Ventures no Direito Comunitário da 
Concorrência”, Almedina, Coimbra, 2006, page 1549 et seq. 
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 As this piece of research is focused on the European context, it is important to 
keep in mind the main goals defined in the EU treaties, which establish that free 
competition and the internal market are nothing more than means to achieve a superior 
end: the European citizen welfare.
12
 According to Professor Froufe, consumer welfare is 
today one of the main purposes of EU competition policy. Whereas in the past EU 
competition law was a tool to achieve economic integration in the internal market today, 
it is mainly focused on safeguarding the European consumer welfare.
13
 It is then safe to 
say that the ultimate and most important purpose of EU competition law is not the 
protection of a free market per se but rather the protection of all market participants, 
especially the European citizen.
14
  
 This statement is in line with what is said by Professor Manuel Fontaine who 
argues that ensuring the society welfare has been one of the most important aims of the 
States throughout the history.
15
 Competition policy is therefore one more instrument 
that States have at their disposal to achieve such aim. Thus, competition policy is 
primarily focused on achieving the society welfare.
16
 
 It would not be reasonable to assume that the European Union could define the 
protection of a free market as its main goal, because a free market does not necessarily 
translate into the safeguard of the public interest. A free market can bring significant 
advantages, but it can also create some problems. In fact, a free market can be 
prejudicial to the public interest inasmuch as market failures (such as externalities, 
imperfect information, abuse of dominant position, etc.) are not corrected under a 
completely free market.  
 Thus, this thesis is based on the premise that a free market is not an end in itself 
but rather a means to achieve a superior end, the social welfare. Even though it implies a 
distortion of competition, a governmental intervention in case of a market failure cannot 
                                                          
12
 The Preamble of the TEU for instance sets that the Union is “determined to promote economic and 
social progress for their peoples (…) within the context of the accomplishment of the internal market” 
(emphasis added). See also Article 3(1) of the TEU. 
13
 Pedro Froufe, “A Reforma do Direito Comunitário da Concorrência: O Sentido Descentralizador e/ou 
Re-Centralizador do Regulamento (CE) Nº 1/2003”, Escola de Direito da Universidade do Minho, 
September 2009. pages 51 et seq. 
14
 Rodrigo Maito da Silveira, “Tributação e Concorrência”, in Instituto Brasileiro de Direito Tributário, 
Quartier Latin, 2011, page 117. 
15
 Manuel Fontaine Campos, “Natureza, origem e exercício do poder político”, in Comunicação 
apresentada no Curso de Ética e Política, Fundação Spes, 2009, page 7. 
16
 See also Luis Fernando Schuartz, “Dogmática Jurídica e Lei 8.884/94”, available at 
http://www.ie.ufrj.br/grc/pdfs/dogmatica_juridica_e_lei_8884_94.pdf [24/02/2015], page 15. 
   
28 
be regarded as a breach of EU competition law purposes as long as it proves to satisfy 
the public interest. The correction of market failures in accordance with the public 
interest and the protection of all market participants, especially the EU citizen in the 
quality of consumer is therefore the most important and ultimate aim of EU competition 
law. 
 
 3.2. Free Competition as a Means to Achieve a Superior End 
 
 If free competition is not the central aim of EU competition law, it is important 
to define its role under the EU legal framework. It is not the author’s intention to deny 
the positive effects that a free market may bring to the society, rather the contrary. The 
fact that free competition may bring significant benefits for the European consumer is 
undeniable. According to the economic theory, free competition in the internal market is 
expected to bring significant advantages both for the European citizen and for the EU 
Member States, e.g., costs reduction, specialization, employment, increased efficiency, 
innovation and better-quality products and services.
17
 Accordingly, free competition is 
one of the most important principles of EU law.  
 However, this principle has to live together with other equally important 
principles and goals of EU law like consumer protection, regional development, 
environmental protection or smart growth. According to Article 7 of the TFEU, the 
Union shall ensure consistency between its policies and activities, taking all of its 
objectives into account. As a consequence, market participants may expect to compete 
freely and under fair conditions, but shall also be aware that when necessary 
governments will intervene in the market with the purpose of accomplishing other 
equally important goals of EU law with which free competition has to live.  
 The history shows that the rules of the market and the Adam Smith’s “invisible 
hand” by themselves are not sufficient to ensure an adequate dynamic of the market as 
well as a suitable allocation of resources from a public interest perspective. As examples 
of that we can point the 1929 Wall Street Crash as well as the more recent global 
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financial crisis of 2008.
18
 As a completely free system does not serve the public interest, 
governmental actions in the market are sometimes required. 
 Such actions, it is important to reinforce, are often made through the tax system. 
For example, governments frequently grant tax benefits for the production of goods that 
the society needs but that are not normally provided by the market. Even though this 
measure affects free competition, it cannot be regarded as having a negative impact 
from a competition policy perspective inasmuch as it benefits the European citizen. 
 Hence, free competition is one of the most important principles of EU 
competition law. There are, however, some deviations to this principle that can be 
justified on grounds of public interest.  
 To identify the situations where these deviations are legitimate, it is necessary to 
make a judgement of proportionality between the positive effects of the governmental 
action (usually, the correction of a market failure) and the negative effects (affecting 
free competition).
19
 If the benefits of the governmental measure outweigh its costs, then 
the impact of such measure cannot be considered negative from a competition policy 
perspective. In the European context, these governmental interventions are commonly 
called state aid. Before advancing to the topic of state aid, however, there is another 
concept that is important to clarify, which is the concept of market failures. 
 
4. Market Failures 
 
 The correction of market failures in accordance with the public interest is one of 
the most important purposes of competition policy and is one of the main reasons that 
justify governmental interventions in the market through the tax system.
20
 Thus, the 
concept of market failures will be invoked very often throughout this academic work. 
For that reason, it is important to discuss this concept in this introductory Part. 
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 The concept of market failures derives from the economic field. A market failure 
occurs essentially when a free market does not allocate the resources efficiently.
21
 More 
specifically, the amount of products supplied does not correspond to the amount of 
products demanded by consumers. This problem may occur due to the absence of some 
economic factors. Market failures are likely to occur, for instance, when market 
participants are exclusively focused on achieving their own interests. When suppliers 
are only focused in maximizing their profits, the outcome of the market will probably be 
inefficient from the public perspective. 
 From the vast number of types of market failures there are some that should be 
mentioned in this piece of research. First of all, market failures can be originated by 
negative externalities. Negative externalities occur when market participants impose a 
cost on third parties and do not have to pay for that.
22
 That would be the case of 
pollution through industrial activity. In a market without governmental actions, market 
participants in the industrial sector could impose a cost to the society (the detriment of 
the environment) and not have to pay for it. 
 Positive externalities can also be the origin of market failures. In some cases, 
market participants are not able to pick the full benefits of their action.
23
 That is the case 
of R&D. R&D can bring major benefits for the society. Sometimes, the positive effects 
collected by the society (the so-called spill-over or free rider effects) are even bigger 
than the benefits collected by the entity developing the R&D activities (that would be 
the case, for instance, of R&D activities in the field of medicine). The free rider effects 
create a reluctance on firms to invest in R&D since they are not able to pick the full 
benefits of their activities, which makes that the amount of money invested in R&D 
lower than what would be socially desirable. 
 Market failures may also be originated by imperfect information. When one of 
the parties of a transaction has more information than the other, it may lead to unfair 
transaction and agency costs, resulting in inefficient market outcomes from the public 
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interest point of view. For instance, regarding the financial market, start-up firms 
frequently have problems in finding a reasonably-priced funding.
24
 
 Significant market power can also create market failures. When a firm obtains 
significant market power in a free market, it is able to charge excessively high prices, 
reduce the levels of supply or exclude trading partners, which translates into an 
inefficient allocation of resources. The abuse of dominant position is a market failure 
that has serious consequences for all market participants. 
 One other market failure that can occur in a free market concerns the provision 
of public goods.
25
 Public goods are goods that are needed by the society but that are not 
normally provided by the market because, since it is not possible to exclude anyone 
from its use, it is impossible to charge its use individually. National defence and 
illumination are examples of public goods that are not normally provided by the market. 
 More factors can originate market failures, such as, geographical location and 
the volatility of products. Nevertheless, all market failures can be corrected through two 
approaches. The first approach concerns the use of regulatory instruments, e.g., 
prohibiting the production of certain products or requiring licenses for their production. 
The other approach to correct market failures is made through governmental 
interventions in the market, known as state aids in the EU context. In this case, 
governments modify the natural allocation of financial resources in the market with the 
purpose of eliminating market failures. There is an extensive variety of schemes that can 
be regarded as state aid, which include the grant of subsidies, tax benefits, loan 
agreements, etc. This thesis however will only give special attention to state aids with a 
tax nature, which might be particularly distortive. 
 
5. The State Aid Control 
 
Tax aids will deserve special emphasis in the following Parts of this piece of 
research because, these are particularly distortive measures. For that reason, it is 
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convenient to make some previous considerations about the state aid control in this 
introductory Part. 
 
 5.1. State Aid as a Valuable Instrument 
 
As it was previously observed, free competition is not a guarantee that the public 
interest will be safeguarded and that is why sometimes governments must intervene. 
Governments usually grant financial aids to certain sectors or specific companies with 
the purpose of solving market failures and thus serve the public interest. 
When governmental actions, in particular the ones that are made through the tax 
system, successfully solve market failures taxes shall be regarded as an ally of 
competition. The basic example is one tax measure that promotes competition in 
monopolistic market or taxes that encourage the development of R&D activities. These 
and other situations where taxes act as an ally of competition are discussed in detail in 
Part III of this essay. 
 
 5.2. The Negative Side of State Aid 
 
In spite of what is said in the previous section, due to lack of budgetary 
discipline, powerful lobbies or corruption, governmental interventions may also lead to 
an inefficient allocation of financial resources. When it occurs, a governmental failure is 
deemed to exist.
26
  
In fact, the State can be a major player responsible for distorting competition. 
Through the tax system, national, regional and even local governments occasionally 
leave certain firms in a stronger position than its competitors without any good reason. 
Granting public money to certain undertakings without ensuring the satisfaction of the 
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public interest is a flagrant distortion of fair competition and of market efficiency.
27
 
When it occurs, taxes shall be considered a foe of competition. 
 
 5.3. The Need for a State aid Control 
 
Through the state aid control, the European Commission ensures that state aids 
are granted in accordance with the public interest and avoids undue distortions of 
competition.  
Whereas in the past this field was seen as the ‘poor relative’ of competition law, 
that is not the case anymore.
28
 The number of state aid cases reaching the General Court 
of the European Union during the last five years is superior to the number of cases of 
other areas of competition law considered all together.
29
 
The system of state aid control makes the European Union the most transparent 
and coherent jurisdiction in the world regarding the grant of state aid. Indeed, it is not 
possible to find a similar system of state aid control in almost any other jurisdiction. 
Only in the EFTA there is an identical regime, which draws inspiration from the EU due 
to the need to coordinate competition law in the EEA. 
The state aid control operates in similar terms as the WTO subsidy control, but 
the state aid control is even more stringent, much due to the active role performed by 
the European Commission. While the WTO subsidy control only occurs ex post, the 
European Commission operates the state aid control both ex ante and ex post i.e., before 
and after the state aid has been granted.
30
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State aid is an area with a strong political component. On the contrary of other 
fields of competition law, state aid control is directed to the States, not to firms.
31
 
Additionally, the central role is performed by a political institution, the European 
Commission, which acts as a supranational supervisor authority.
32
 
One can identify four goals of state aid control. Firstly, state aid control seeks to 
ensure the maintenance of the level playing field in the internal market. Since 
competition is regarded as a useful instrument to promote EU citizen welfare, this 
regime attempts to guarantee that competition will not be distorted by Member States, 
unless there is a major reason of public interest.  
Secondly, state aid control has a redistributive rationale.
33
 Even though state aid 
has the potential to distort competition, the European Commission is aware that state 
aids may also have positive impacts in the market. The most efficient way to produce 
positive effects is by correcting market failures. A state aid that corrects a market failure 
and improves the social welfare is regarded as “good aid”.  
Thirdly, state aid control seeks to reduce the harmful effects of subsidy races 
within the internal market. As that will be described later (Part II, section 7) subsidy 
races occur when Member States compete with each other in an individual rationale 
with the intention of collecting a large share of international profits. Since almost all 
Member States adopt this strategy, the result is a collective waste of public resources.
34
 
By controlling the tax aids permitted, the European Commission reduces the possibility 
of subsidy races to the bottom.
35
 
Finally, the state aid control can also be seen as an instrument responsible for 
restricting governmental failures. Due to several reasons (lack of budgetary discipline, 
powerful lobbies, corruption, etc.), sometimes governments spend public money 
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incorrectly by offering state aids in an inefficient manner. In cases where States control 
funds, powerful companies frequently allocate resources to lobby for it.
36
 Through state 
aid provisions the European Commission is able to ensure that public money is 
adequately invested. 
 
 5.4. The Enforcement of the State Aid Control 
 
 Under Article 108(3) of the TFEU, all new state aids must be notified to the 
European Commission before being implemented.
37
 This is the first and indispensable 
step that all Member States must take in order to lawfully grant state aids.
38
 If Member 
States grant a state aid without complying with the notification obligation, the 
Commission will act in accordance with its ex officio powers and require the recovery of 
the unlawfully granted aid. 
The procedure of notification is regulated on the Procedural Regulation.
39
 Under 
Article 2 of the Procedural Regulation “(…) any plans to grant new aid shall be notified 
to the Commission in sufficient time by the Member State concerned”. Even though 
Article 108(3) of the TFEU does not explicitly refer it, it is settled case law that the 
obligation to notify the Commission belongs to the Member State concerned, not to the 
firm or firms receiving the state aid.
40
  
 To help Member States determine the situations in which a measure constitutes 
state aid and must be notified, the European Commission developed a complex legal 
framework, encompassing secondary regulations, guidelines, frameworks and notices. 
The legal instrument that regulates the grant of tax aids is the 1998 Commission Notice 
on fiscal state aid.
41
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 Article 3 of the Procedural Regulation, foresees the “standstill obligation”. 
According to such provision, until the Commission’s approval Member States must 
refrain themselves from granting any state aid. After notifying the Commission, 
Member States shall wait for a positive, conditional or negative decision.
42
 
If one Member State grants a state aid without prior approval of the European 
Commission, such aid is considered unlawful and must be recovered. The purpose is to 
re-establish the situation that previously existed.
43
 
There are no specific rules at supranational level regarding the recovery 
procedure. Instead, according to Article 14(3) of the Procedure Regulation, the recovery 
of unlawful aid shall be administrated according to national law.
44
 
Finally, it is convenient to note that the powers of the Commission to recover 
unlawful state aid are limited to a period of ten years counting from the day on which 
the aid was conceded.
45
 After that ten-year period, the Commission is not legitimated to 
require the recovery of the unlawfully granted state aid. 
 
5.5. The Concept of State Aid 
 
On the topic of the concept of state aid, the regulatory framework, the case law 
and the literature are fairly extensive, surely because the European Commission has not 
issued yet an official and legally binding definition of state aid. Article 107 of the TFEU 
is the basic provision regarding state aid and should be the starting point to define its 
concept. 
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Article 107(1) defines state aid as “(…) any aid granted by a Member State or 
through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods (…) in 
so far as it affects trade between Member States”. Through the text of this provision, 
considered together with the jurisprudence of the European Courts, one can identify 
four conditions that a measure must fulfil to be considered state aid.  
Firstly, a state aid always involves a transfer of state resources by public 
authorities. The transfer does not have necessarily to be made by the central 
government. It can also be made by regional or local governments, as well as other 
institutions controlled by the State, e.g., public banks.
46
 The concept of transfer of state 
resources includes not only direct transfers (for instance, subsidies or loans) but also the 
attribution of indirect benefits that affect the public budget, such as, tax exemptions.
47
 It 
is fundamental to keep this in mind to comprehend part of the scope of this thesis.
 
 
The second characteristic of a state aid is the grant of an economic advantage to 
an undertaking. The concept of undertaking applicable here is the same that is used in 
other areas of competition law, which covers “any entity engaged in an economic 
activity, regardless of its legal status and the way in which it is financed”.48 Thus, non-
profit entities such as charities and universities are covered by this concept and subject 
to state aid control. State aids to non-profit entities are also regarded as potentially 
distortive. As the former Commission Vice President in charge of competition policy 
said, even though non-profit entities sometimes play an important social role, it is 
fundamental to ensure that they do not benefit from an undue advantage when they 
operate in the same markets as commercial players.
49
 
Thirdly, a state aid is a measure that is always selective. This means that the 
state aid is only available for certain undertakings, sectors, products, regions or types of 
firms. The opposite of a selective measure is a general measure i.e., a measure that is 
available to all types of businesses. A general measure applies without excluding 
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sectors, products, regions, or firms and cannot be regarded as state aid.
50
 As 
Friederiszick et al.
51
 note, it is important to pay special attention to measures that are de 
jure general but de facto selective. These are measures that theoretically have general 
applicability but in practice apply selectively. For instance, a measure shall be regarded 
as selective when one government is aware that only one company in its jurisdiction 
employs more than 1000 workers and designs a statute establishing that all businesses 
that employ more than 1000 workers may benefit of a 10% reduction of the corporate 
income tax rate. Such measure is not de jure selective but is de facto selective, because 
it was a priori projected to favour only one company in that jurisdiction. Such measure 
shall therefore be regarded as satisfying the characteristic of selectivity. 
Finally, state aid is a measure that distorts or at least has the potential to distort 
competition and trade between Member States. This condition is usually divided in two 
parts. It is settled case law that the potential to distort competition does not have to be 
significant or substantial.
52
 This condition is satisfied even if small amounts of aid and 
minor market shares are at stake. It is common practice to consider that all selective 
measures distort competition. In order to consider that a measure affects trade between 
Member States it is enough that the undertaking receiving the aid operates in a market 
in which there is trade between Member States. Since nowadays there is trade between 
Member States in almost every market, practically all measures are liable to affect trade 
between Member States. 
 It is convenient to note that is possible to find a European influence in the 
concept of subsidy used at WTO level. The EU is a WTO Member and there is an 
obvious similarity between the concept of state aid under EU law and the concept of 
subsidy under the WTO rules. Subsidy is the equivalent term for state aid at WTO level 
and such concept is defined in Article 1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM). According to this provision, a subsidy is deemed to 
exist if there is “a financial contribution made by a government or any public body”.53 
The different forms of financial contributions include (i) direct transfers of funds, 
including potential transfers, such as loan guarantees, (ii) foregone revenues that are 
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otherwise due (for instance, tax benefits), (iii) goods and services provided by the 
government other than general infrastructure and (iv) payments by a government to a 
funding mechanism. Thus, one may conclude there is a clear parallelism between this 
criterion and the criterion of “transfer of state resources” foreseen in the EU state aid 
control. In addition to financial contributions by a government, Article 1.1(b) of the 
SCM establishes that in order to a subsidy be deemed to exist, the financial contribution 
must confer a benefit to the recipient. Likewise, there is an obvious parallelism between 
this criterion and “the grant of a selective economic advantage” established in the EU 
state aid control. 
To conclude, there is no doubt that the notion of state aid is extremely broad and 
includes an endless number of measures. This concept covers any measure that 
selectively relieves the normal expenses of an undertaking, e.g., capital injections, loans 
guarantees, tax benefits and preferential interest rates. A proper definition of state aid is 
thus crucial to increase legal certainty. In the sequence of the 2012 State Aid 
Modernisation initiative, the European Commission is expected to publish a Notice 
containing accurate guidelines to define the concept of state aid and each of its 
characteristics based on the legal framework that the Commission has created as well as 
on the ECJ case law. While an official version of such Notice is not published, one can 
define state aid as the grant either direct or indirect by the State or any other public 
authority controlled by the State through public resources of an economic advantage 
only in favour of one entity or one group of entities engaged in an economic activity. 
 
 5.6. The Concept of Tax Aid 
 
"We need a full picture of the tax rulings practices in the EU to identify if and where 
competition in the Single Market is being distorted through selective tax advantages.”54 
Margrethe Vestager, Commissioner in charge of competition policy. 
 
It was already observed that there are two approaches that governments can 
adopt to grant state aid. Governments can grant state aid directly, which implies giving 
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funds to firms, such as, subsidies or loans.
55
 Alternatively, governments can grant state 
aid indirectly, by abdicating of revenues that are otherwise due. That is the case of tax 
benefits. By reducing the tax obligations of certain companies, governments may be 
granting a state aid, since they are relieving the normal expenses of those companies. 
This last type of state aid, tax aid, will deserve particular highlight in the following Parts 
of this thesis and that is why we should clarify this concept. 
Based on what was described in the previous sections, it is not difficult to 
imagine situations where taxes configure a situation of state aid. Tax statutes that 
involve a loss of revenue that would otherwise be due, confer a selective economic 
advantage to an undertaking or a group of undertakings, and affect competition and 
trade between Member States, constitute a situation of state aid.
56
 This is what is 
established in the 1998 Commission Notice on fiscal state aid.
57
  
For instance, when a central government grants a reduction of tax rates in favour 
of a specific firm, such situation might constitute state aid. This measure implies an 
indirect transfer of state resources inasmuch as involves a loss of revenues that was 
otherwise due,
58
 confers an economic advantage to an undertaking that does not follow 
from the natural course of its business, can be selective and is likely to affect 
competition and trade between Member States.  
The same can be said when a government grants a tax benefit to the exportation 
of a certain good, for instance bananas. Such measure involves a transfer of State 
resources, confers an economic advantage, is selective because it just benefits the 
producers of bananas and affects trade and competition between Member States.
59
 
The notion of tax aid encompasses any kind of tax that is susceptible of 
conferring an economic advantage to certain taxpayers, such as, reductions of the tax 
base (allowances and extraordinary amortizations), reductions of the amount of tax due 
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(tax exemptions and tax credits), tax deferrals or even exceptional rescheduling of the 
tax debt.
60
 The ECJ has already held, for instance, that a rebate on energy consumption 
taxes only benefiting certain undertakings manufacturing goods constitutes tax aid.
61
 
Lenience in the recovery of tax claims from undertakings was also considered to 
constitute tax aid.
62
 
Therefore, one may accept that the concept of state aid is so broad that covers a 
significant number of tax measures. Since it covers so many tax measures, the question 
that can arise is whether the control of such measures exercised by the European 
Commission does not constitute an undue restriction of EU Member States’ tax 
sovereignty.  
It is the author’s opinion that the tax aid control does not imply any illegal 
restriction of Member States’ power to tax. First of all, whether it is true that Member 
States maintain tax sovereignty, it is also true that such sovereignty must be exercised 
consistently with EU law. Secondly, the TFEU confines the scope of action of the EU in 
tax matters to a very limited number of situations, but among those matters we can find 
competition issues in the form of tax aid.
63
 Through the European Treaties, Member 
States gave the European Commission the competence to control such measures so, the 
tax aids control cannot be regarded as an undue restriction of Member States’ tax 
sovereignty. The truth is that currently EU Member States already do not have full fiscal 
sovereignty. Today, tax sovereignty is more apparent than real
64
 and the restrictions 
imposed by the tax aid control is just one example of that as well as indirect tax 
coordination. 
It is important to note that not only tax aids can be an ally or a foe of 
competition. As it will be shown in the subsequent Parts of this thesis, taxes that do not 
fulfil all the conditions of state aid may have also a positive or a negative impact on 
                                                          
60
 Rodrigo Maito da Silveira, “Tributação e Concorrência”, op. cit., page 219 et seq. 
61
 Case C-143/99, Judgement of the Court of 8 November 2001, Adria-Wien Pipeline GmbH. Originally 
cited in Ben Terra and Peter Wattel, “European Tax Law”, op. cit., page 165.  
62
 Case C-276/02, Judgement of the Court of 14 September 2004, Commission v Italy. Originally cited in 
Ben Terra and Peter Wattel, “European Tax Law”, op. cit., page 165. 
63
 The remaining areas where the EU has scope of action concerning tax issues are matters of multilateral 
surveillance, the proper functioning of the internal market, tax discrimination, and ad hoc tax measures to 
attain specific objectives of the Union. For further developments see Gaëtan Nicodème, “Corporate tax 
competition and coordination in the European Union: What do we know? Where do we stand?”, in 
Economic papers of the European Commission Directorate-Generale for Economic and Financial Affairs, 
June 2006, nº 250, pages 8 et seq. 
64
 Ana Paula Dourado, “Lições de Direito Fiscal Europeu”, Coimbra Editora, 2010, page 223. 
   
42 
competition. The fact that some taxes do not comply with all the conditions of state aid 
simply means that they are out of the scope of the Commission’s state aid control. 
Taxes with general applicability, for instance, do not fall under the Commission’s 
control, but can be responsible for affecting (either positively or negatively) 
competition. Thus, the author will not only focus the analysis on tax aids, but also on 
taxes that, even though not being state aid, can perform the role of an ally or of a foe of 
competition.  
Tax aids deserved a previous note firstly, because these are particularly 
distortive tax measures. Secondly, for the reasons explained above, the European tax aid 
control is the perfect illustration of the main argument adopted in this thesis i.e., that 
taxes can be an obstacle but also an ally of competition. Lastly, tax aids will deserve a 
particular highlight in the subsequent Parts and so, it was necessary to clarify this 
regime in this introductory Part, which aims to provide the reader an indispensable 
background to understand the following Parts of the thesis. 
 
6. The Legal Status Quo in the European Union 
 
As the following Parts will prove, the legal status quo in the European Union 
regarding taxation involves significant problems from a competition policy perspective. 
For that reason, one of the main purposes of this study is to provide some 
recommendations to change the legal status quo (task that is realised in Part IV). 
Keeping in mind the aim of this introductory Part, this is the right place to make some 
previous considerations about the legal status quo in the EU. 
The legal status quo in the EU regarding taxation is characterised by a large 
diversity, because each Member State has its own tax system. This vast diversity in the 
internal market shall be seen as a factor that has a severe impact on competition because 
European firms are subject to different tax rates, different administrative costs and 
different accounting rules. Substantial differences in overall tax burdens between 
undertakings from different Member States operating within the same market frustrate 
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free competition.
65
 The lack of tax coordination is therefore an extremely serious 
problem from a competition policy perspective. 
The debate regarding the problems that the lack of tax coordination in the EU 
entails is not new. In fact, the lack of tax coordination is one of the most debated topics 
in the European Union. The first proposal to coordinate tax systems in Europe was 
made in 1962 by the Committee chaired by prof. Fritz Neumark.
66
 However, the 
progress made since then is very limited.  
It is important to make clear from the beginning that the author does not 
advocate that full tax harmonisation should be defined as an immediate goal by EU 
policy makers. That would not be reasonable. Past initiatives have proved that any 
attempts to establish full tax harmonisation in the European Union are condemned to 
failure. Member States are not willing to abdicate of their tax sovereignty because, after 
having had renounced to other important instruments, especially the monetary policy, 
tax policy is the last instrument on their possession to control public finances.
67
 The 
different cultures that prevail in the European Union are another issue that makes very 
difficult to achieve full tax harmonisation in the short term.  
Thus, the author argues that the focus should rather be in attempting to 
coordinate just certain aspects of national tax systems that are essential to ensure the 
maintenance of the level playing field in the internal market. Raising the bar too high 
can easily defraud the expectation and lead to the immediate failure of political 
initiatives on that sense. Conversely, concentrate all efforts in a restricted number of key 
issues may lead to success.  
One reason that justifies the absence of significant progresses on direct taxation 
is the unanimity rule foreseen on Article 115 of the TFUE, which establishes that the 
adoption of any tax decision in the EU has to be accepted by all Member States.
68
 
Whereas the number of matters that require unanimity has decreased during the last 
years, such rule has been maintained in relation to tax matters.
69
 The unanimity rule 
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makes the legislative procedure really difficult because, since taxation is a very 
sensitive matter, there is always at least one Member State that disagrees with the 
legislative proposal. 
As a consequence of the difficulties imposed by the unanimity rule, the 
achievements on direct taxation at the European level regard discrete matters, namely, 
the Parent-Subsidiary Directive
70
, the Merger Directive
71
, the Interest and Royalties 
Directive
72
, the Savings Directive
73
 and the Arbitration Convention
74
. 
The need to create some convergence on tax systems among the 28 Member 
States so that European firms can compete under equivalent conditions is evident. This 
is a vital step to advance in the single market integration process. If the internal market 
is supposed to be a market without internal borders, European firms should not receive 
differentiated treatments depending on the territory in which they have their 
headquarters established. And it is convenient to keep in mind that such differentiated 
treatments relate not only with the applicable tax rates but also with administrative and 
accounting rules, which make the conditions of competition unfair.  
Tax coordination can be achieved by two ways. One way is through positive 
integration which requires positive actions at Community level such as, common policy 
making as well as the adoption of directives and regulations. The other way to achieve 
tax coordination is through negative integration which is made through legally 
enforceable prohibitions on certain measures of Member States or undertakings that 
violate the fundamental rules of the internal market, such as distortions of 
competition.
75
 
In fact, the biggest achievements in European tax law especially in what 
concerns direct taxation are due to the decisions of the European Court of Justice. The 
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need to coordinate tax rules to avoid injuries in the internal market has been confirmed 
by the ECJ which has been making use of the fundamental freedoms and other Treaty 
provisions (in particular, the state aid provisions and the non-discrimination principle) 
to harmonise certain aspects of direct taxation through its decisions. The traditional 
example is the Marks & Spencer
76
 case, perhaps the most relevant case regarding 
corporate taxation in the internal market. In this case the ECJ held that the prohibition 
imposed by the UK tax authorities to offset the losses of Marks & Spencer’s 
subsidiaries in Belgium, France and Germany constituted an unjustified breach of the 
freedom of establishment inasmuch as the subsidiaries had exhausted the possibilities 
available in their States of residence of having the losses taken into account and no 
possibilities remain for those losses to be taken into account in their States of residence 
in future accounting periods.
77
 
Some authors have been criticising the approach adopted by the ECJ saying that 
the Court has made an excessive use of this behaviour in order to offset the lack of tax 
coordination by way of EU legislation. However, even assuming that the decisions of 
the ECJ are not the most adequate method to harmonise tax matters it is not possible to 
ignore the fact that the ECJ was created to guarantee the correct application of EU 
law.
78
 The author believes that while Member States are not able coordinate certain 
matters of direct taxation, it is preferable to have the ECJ with this approach, 
interpreting and adapting EU law to the main goals of the internal market. One cannot 
forget that Member States’ tax sovereignty must be exercised in accordance with EU 
law and the ECJ is the European institution responsible for ensuring the proper 
application of EU law. 
The high compliance costs of having to deal with 28 tax systems when 
exercising economic activities across the internal market is one reason that makes 
European firms less competitive and less efficient. The need to know the provisions of 
each tax system, together with the need to deal with the tax authorities of each Member 
State where a company exercises its economic activities, represent striking obstacles for 
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European firms that develop intra-EU operations.
79
 These obstacles imply heavy 
financial costs and significant bureaucratic work, which makes European firms less 
competitive and efficient, breaching one of the most important purposes of competition 
policy (see section 3.1). 
Another problematic consequence that the lack of coordination on tax matters 
involves is harmful tax competition. Due to the fundamental freedoms, companies are 
able to design their tax planning strategies through the establishment of their businesses 
in the legal system that better serves their tax purposes. Thus, the tendency in the 
European Union during the last two decades has been that Member States have lowered 
the corporate income tax rates.
80
 Member States that offer the lowest corporate income 
tax rates are able to attract more businesses and mobile factors to their jurisdictions. 
This behaviour is really problematic from a competition policy perspective because it 
affects the level playing field in the internal market as there is an enormous disparity 
between the tax treatments conferred to the actors of the same single market. 
To summarize, an increased coordination of tax rules at European level would 
definitely make competition in the internal market fairer. Even though full tax 
harmonisation is an overly ambitious goal to be pursued at the moment, at least it would 
be expectable to achieve some convergence on matters that significantly influence the 
conditions of competition like administrative tax rules, accounting rules and exit 
taxation. As we will see in the subsequent Parts of this piece of research, tax 
coordination is an indispensable step to reduce the negative effects that taxes have on 
competition. 
The question is how the EU can implement any type of tax coordination in the 
absence of a formal power to do that. The answer may imply the use of soft law 
instruments. In the past, there was an initiative in the European Union involving the 
adoption of a soft law instrument, which allowed creating some convergence for the 
first time on an area of direct taxation, which was the Code of Conduct for Business 
Taxation. The Code of Conduct marked an historical moment where the representatives 
of EU Member States were able to, for the first time, discuss and reach an agreement on 
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matters of direct taxation. Later, the Code was converted into hard-law. A re-launch of 
this initiative taking into account the latest developments on international taxation and 
broadening its scope to other areas of direct taxation could produce interesting results. 
 Another instrument that would certainly be very useful to reduce the negative 
impact that the lack of tax coordination in the EU has on competition is the Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base. This proposal has the aim of coordinating certain 
rules regarding corporate income taxation in the internal market, without implying the 
harmonisation of tax rates. These and other pertinent initiatives to change the legal 
status quo are discussed in the last Part of this essay. 
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PART II - TAXES AS A FOE OF COMPETITION 
 
1. General Context 
 
After having clarified the operative concepts of the topic, it is time to advance to 
the analysis of the impact of taxes on competition properly said. This second Part of the 
thesis is focused on demonstrating the negative impact that taxes have on competition.  
As previously noted, competition can be a really valuable tool to improve the 
European citizen welfare. Increased competition can lead to higher efficiency, 
innovation, and cheaper and better products. As a consequence, the competition process 
shall remain undistorted, unless there is a valid reason of public reason justifying the 
distortion. 
Since taxes represent a significant financial burden and affect the supply and 
demand of resources in the market, they affect market participants’ performance. 
Consequently, taxes are liable to create obstacles to the competition process. When 
governments make use of the tax system to benefit certain firms, sectors or regions, 
without the public interest in their horizon, they may be creating serious obstacles from 
a competition policy perspective.  
Furthermore, in the European context the lack of tax coordination represents one 
of the main obstacles to competition. First of all, the lack of tax coordination makes that 
companies of the same single market compete under different and unfair tax rules. 
Secondly, the lack of tax coordination also reduces economic efficiency as it involves 
high compliance costs for companies exercising economic activities throughout the 
internal market. Hence, taxes are a foe and represent serious obstacles for competition. 
In the present Part of this academic work the author analyses numerous 
situations where taxes affect competition. It will be initially explained the negative 
impact that custom duties and tax aids can create from a competition policy perspective. 
Both custom duties and tax aids are instruments that governments have at their disposal 
to protect certain national companies, restricting competition. These issues are, 
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nonetheless, satisfactorily regulated in EU law in order to avoid serious distortions of 
competition.  
Then, we will analyse some of the problems that the current legal tax framework 
implies for European companies, distorting competition and preventing them from 
being fully competitive and efficient, some of the most important purposes of 
competition policy. That is the case of the application of different tax rules in the 
internal market, the impossibility of cross-border relief, the re-registration process of 
cars and exit taxation.  
The author will then analyse the serious problems originated by tax competition, 
which emerge when countries compete with each other through the tax system on an 
individual basis in order to attract direct investment to their jurisdictions. These 
problems include waste of fiscal revenues, obscurity in national tax systems and 
affecting international trade. But the most serious problem that tax competition 
originates from a competition policy perspective is that it affects the level playing field, 
making competition in the internal market really unfair. 
Finally, the author will describe the serious distortions of competition that 
several companies, with the assistance of some governments (especially, the Irish, the 
Luxembourg, and the Dutch), have been creating in the internal market over the last 
years by resorting to aggressive tax planning, which includes the erosion of tax bases, 
the shifting of income and agreements between these companies and the national 
governments, which can consubstantiate into tax aids.  
The final section contains the main conclusions of this Part. 
 
2.  Custom Duties 
 
Custom duties or tariffs (these terms are usually used interchangeably) are a 
simple example of how taxes can have a negative impact on competition and trade. 
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Some authors even consider custom duties as the most evident tax impediment to the 
functioning of the internal market.
81
  
Custom duties are taxes levied on goods imported into one country by the 
custom authorities. These taxes can be imposed on a specific basis (not based on the 
value of the imported product but rather on its weight, volume or quantity) or on an ad 
valorem basis (they are calculated based on the value of the imported product i.e., 
through the application of a tax rate) or as a combination of both.
82
  
Custom duties have dual functionality. On one hand, they serve to raise revenues 
for the State. On the other hand and most importantly for the purpose of this thesis, 
custom duties often serve to protect specific domestic industries from foreign 
competitors.
83
 These taxes increase the price of imported goods, thus discouraging their 
purchase and giving an advantage to locally-produced goods. 
 Custom duties are a tool that allows governments to protect their economy, 
controlling the flow of goods. Such control of importation may however constitute a 
serious restriction of competition. Custom duties interfere with the normal balance of 
the market, affecting the natural supply and demand as they increase the prices of 
foreign goods. If all the countries massively discourage the importation of goods and 
services, free trade and economies of scale would not be possible, which results in less 
competition harming the average citizen.  
By discriminating domestic and foreign goods, governments ease the production 
of national products, reducing internal competition with all the problems that it entails 
e.g., less innovation as well as more expensive and worst-quality products. Custom 
duties might therefore be a serious foe of competition. 
Several international agreements have been celebrated in order to prevent the 
massive charge of custom duties and the consequent distortions of competition. The 
most important and thus briefly referenced in this work is the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs (GATT). The GATT, established in 1948, was both an international 
organisation and a multilateral treaty. The first goal of the GATT is to liberalise global 
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trade and deals with several international trade problems, e.g., countervailing duties, 
custom duties, quantitative restrictions and subsidies.
84
 Moreover, the GATT led to the 
creation of the WTO in 1994, currently the larger institution at international level with 
160 members, including some of the major economies of the world like the EU, the US, 
Russia, China and Japan.
85
 The WTO plays a very active role, ensuring that free 
competition and free trade exist at international level. 
One of the most important cases at WTO level is the Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages case.
86
 This case concerns not exactly the levy of custom duties (taxes levied 
at the frontier) but rather the imposition at internal level of taxes that confer a 
differentiated treatment between similar national and foreign goods, which are equally 
distortive. Giving application to the national treatment principle, the WTO bodies 
settled for the first time that similar domestic and foreign products must receive an 
equal tax treatment, in order to safeguard free competition and international trade. This 
case was marked in the history of international trade law as the most important cases 
regarding the strict relationship that should exist between taxation and competition. 
Regarding EU law, the European Union also plays an important role on the 
regulation of custom duties. In accordance to the Article 28 of the TFEU the European 
Union is a Customs Union. As a consequence, Member States are forbidden of 
imposing custom duties or any charge having an equivalent effect to a custom duty in 
order to facilitate the free trade of goods and services in the internal market and avoid 
distortions of competition (Article 30 of the TEU).
87
  
Moreover, Article 110 of the TEU prohibits any discriminatory and protective 
internal taxes. Thus, while Article 30 deals with fiscal barriers to trade levied at the 
frontiers, Article 110 addresses fiscal rules that apply internally within a Member State, 
prohibiting aggravated taxes on similar foreign goods (like the Japan – Taxes on 
Alcoholic Beverages case). According to Barnard, these provisions are supposed to 
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guarantee the complete neutrality of internal taxation as regards competition between 
domestic and imported products in order to ensure normal conditions of competition.
88
 
The Community Customs Code
89
 entered into force in 1992, and was replaced in 
2008 by the Modernised Customs Code.
90
 Through these legal instruments the 
European Union gave application to the Treaty provisions and effectively prevented the 
imposition of custom duties in the internal market, eliminating any restriction of 
competition that the differentiated tax treatment between national and foreign goods 
implies.
91
  
Contrarily to the WTO, that only establishes that Member States are obliged to 
keep the applied custom duties rates below an established tariff ceiling,
92
 the EU 
prohibits the imposition of any custom duty on goods crossing the internal market, 
because those custom duties are regarded as a deterrent for competition and an 
impediment to the functioning of the internal market. 
To conclude, custom duties represent an obvious situation where taxes have a 
serious impact on competition. And not only taxes that are levied at the frontier may 
affect competition and international trade. Taxes applied internally, conferring a 
differentiated treatment between similar national and foreign goods, may also severely 
affect competition. So, taxes levied either at the frontier or internally that confer a 
differentiated treatment between similar national and foreign goods can be a strong foe 
of competition. Nevertheless, the reality is that the imposition of these taxes is 
stringently regulated at WTO and especially at European level with the purpose of 
avoiding the harmful effects that it involves for competition and consequently for the 
society.  
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3.  Tax Aids 
 
Even though this topic was debated in detail above, the present Part would not 
be complete without a reference to the distorting aids (or subsidies) in particular, the 
ones that are granted through the tax system. Selective tax aids may be particularly 
distortive. 
Governments often intervene in the market by granting financial aids to certain 
sectors or specific companies with the purpose of solving market failures. The problem 
is that occasionally, either by lack of budgetary discipline, powerful lobbies or due to 
corruption, governments do not perform such task adequately from a public interest 
perspective. Sometimes governments grant public money through the tax system (tax 
exemptions, tax allowances, tax deferrals…) to companies that do not prosecute 
activities of public interest or, even though they do it, the funds are granted in a 
selective manner whereas they should have been attributed in a general way. The grant 
of selective tax advantages should be avoided always as possible from a competition 
policy perspective to avoid distortions of the level playing field. 
In the same manner that custom duties affect competition and international trade, 
the same can be said about tax aids granted to the production of certain products. For 
instance, if one government grants a selective tax advantage to one of its national 
companies with the aim of stimulating the exportation of national products it is 
distorting competition and international trade. This measure allows such company to 
sell its products at lower prices and places it in a situation of comparative advantage 
over its competitors (either nationals or foreigners), distorting competition and 
ultimately affecting the normal supply and demand. Subsidies or state aids, in particular 
tax aids, constitute a typical barrier to trade and create severe distortions of competition.  
A tax aid is characterised for always involving a transfer of state resources by 
public authorities, even though indirectly, considering that it represents foregone 
revenue for the State. Also, a tax aid implicates the selective grant of an economic 
advantage to an undertaking and it is a measure that distorts or at least has the potential 
to distort competition and trade between Member States (see Part I, sections 5.5 and 
5.6). 
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Provided that it is made in selective terms, the adoption of any of the following 
measures may constitute distortive tax aid: the grant of a reduction of the tax base 
(through tax allowances or extraordinary amortizations), the grant of a reduction of the 
amount of tax due (through tax exemptions or tax credits), the grant of tax deferrals or 
even exceptional rescheduling of the tax debt.
93
 
Thus, tax aids may severely affect competition with all the problems that less 
competition entails in the long run for the average citizen (less innovation as well as 
more expensive and worst-quality products). For that reason, tax aids are in principle 
forbidden by the GATT
94
 as well as by the EU state aid control. 
One case that has attracted much attention and is a good example of how taxes 
can assume the form of distortive aids concerns the giant of informatics Apple Inc. 
Recently, Apple’s Chief Financial Officer admitted before the US Senate that Apple 
negotiated with the Irish government a 2% corporate income tax applicable to the 
Apple’s subsidiary based in Ireland, whereas the normal corporate income tax in Ireland 
is 12.5%.
95
  
Apple argues that the company did not violate the law since such favourable tax 
treatment granted by the Irish government cannot be regarded as illegal state aid. The 
issue in this case is whether this tax treatment granted by the Irish government was 
selective or not. Even if by law such favourable tax treatment could be granted in favour 
of any company, it can still be regarded as selective aid if in practice it only applies in 
favour of that company (de facto selectivity). There are no doubts that in this case the 
remaining conditions for a measure to be considered tax aid are present, since it implies 
a loss of revenue for the Irish budget (transfer of State resource), confers an economic 
advantage to Apple and affects trade and competition between Member States.  
Thus, the European Commission has to scrutinise if this aid was granted 
selectively and if it falls under any exception to the general prohibition of state aid 
foreseen on Articles 107(2) and 107(3). If the Commission considers this measure as 
prohibited tax aid, such decision implies the reestablishment of the situation that 
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previously existed, i.e., the recovery of the illegally granted state aid (about 10.5% of 
Apple’s turnover during the past ten years, since the agreement dates back to 1991 but 
the powers of the Commission to recover unlawful state aid are limited to a period of 
ten years) and the respective interests. 
Based on as well as in section 5 of the previous Part, one must conclude that tax 
aids represent another situation where taxes can be a serious foe of competition, making 
the competition process truly unfair. Tax aids granted to certain undertakings can distort 
the level playing field in the internal market inasmuch as they put their recipients in a 
comparative advantage over their competitors, damaging the average European citizen 
in the long run due to the problems that the reduction of competition involves. 
 
4.  The Lack of Tax Coordination 
 
The lack of tax coordination in the EU and the consequent existence of 28 
different tax systems in the internal market also create significant obstacles at various 
levels to competition. 
Firstly, European firms compete under different rules. These different rules do 
not only involve the application of different tax rates, but also different administrative 
procedures (different temporal requirements and different financial costs to satisfy the 
tax obligations) and different accounting rules. This opinion is supported by Terra and 
Wattel, who unreservedly say that “[d]ifferences between Member States’ domestic 
laws and administrative practices may cause serious distortions to the conditions of 
competition within the internal market”.96 
One company that is allowed to satisfy one specific tax obligation in one year is 
certainly in advantage facing a company that it obliged to satisfy the same tax 
obligation in one month. During that one-year period the first company has at its 
disposal financial resources that may result in a better performance in the market 
whereas its competitor had to deliver those financial resources to the State coffers by 
the end of the one-month period. So, not only the different tax rates applicable across 
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the EU, but also the different administrative procedures and the different accounting 
rules, make the competition process unfair. 
Another example that illustrates how different tax rules in the internal market 
distorts competition can be found in the excise duties applied on gasoline across the 
EU territory. Even though excise duties were supposed to be harmonised at European 
level due to the imposition made by Article 113 of the TFEU,
97
 the truth is that the 
Directive
98
 giving application to such provision is not stringent enough to effectively 
coordinate the application of excise duties on gasoline. Due to the high dependence of 
this good, the price of gasoline plays a key role in several industries, such as, 
distribution companies, car rental and trucking. The application of different excise 
duties on gasoline across the internal market changes significantly the price of this 
good, distorting competition in those industries. For instance, since the beginning of 
the year 2015 taxes (which include excise duties, a new road contribution, a new 
carbon fee and VAT) are responsible for increasing the price of gasoline in Portugal in 
13.7% (€0.19 per litre) when compared to the neighbouring country Spain. This makes 
very difficult for Portuguese companies whose economic activity highly depends of 
gasoline to be as efficient and competitive as their neighbour competitors. 
This variance of the tax rules within the internal market has the additional 
disadvantage of harming companies that exercise economic activities across the internal 
market. Companies exercising activities throughout the internal market must be aware 
of the tax rules applicable in all jurisdictions where they perform an economic activity 
and they also have to deal with the tax administration of each Member State. So 
considering a company that performs an economic activity in all Member States, it must 
be aware of the specificities of each of the 28 tax systems of the European Union, in 
order to satisfy its tax obligations. Furthermore, it also has to deal with 28 tax 
administrations. This involves high compliance costs and heavy administrative burdens 
for that company.
99
 As a consequence, the lack of tax coordination makes EU-based 
companies less efficient and less competitive. The adoption of common standards 
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applicable across throughout the internal market is fundamental from a competition 
policy perspective, in order to make European companies more competitive and 
efficient. 
European firms have to face extra difficulties when compared to their American, 
Japanese or Chinese competitors, who only have to deal with one tax system and one 
tax administration, even though they exercise economic activities throughout their 
whole respective territory.
100
 Facing European firms, the foreign counterparts can be 
more competitive and have a better performance in the worldwide market, because they 
have less compliance costs and less administrative burdens. In the long run, the 
European economy is not able to accompany the growth of its rival economies, which 
has negative consequences for the European citizen.  
Therefore, one shall conclude that the lack of tax coordination in the internal 
market represents a strong obstacle for competition. On one hand, it results in unfair 
competition because it obliges European firms to compete with each other under 
different tax rules, affecting the level playing field. On the other hand, the lack of tax 
coordination makes companies exercising economic activities throughout the internal 
market less competitive due to the high compliance costs that they have to support to 
fulfil their tax obligations. The fact that European companies are less competitive is 
something that is against the main purposes of the EU competition policy. 
 
5.  The Impossibility of Cross-Border Relief 
 
The impossibility of cross-border relief constitutes another situation where taxes 
act against competition. Under the current European regulatory framework, cross-border 
relief for losses incurred by associated companies located in different Member States is 
not allowed. In other words, one group of companies exercising activities across the 
internal market is not allowed to consolidate their profits and losses. Each affiliated 
company of a group is taxed separately by the country in which it operates (the so-
called, separate-accounting allocation method). 
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As a consequence, if the group’s losses in one Member State are superior to all 
its profits made elsewhere in the EU, the group still has to pay taxes in the Member 
States where profits were made.
101
 Thus, the tax burden that one group of companies 
has to support can be much superior than it was suppose in a market without internal 
borders. For that reason, groups of companies see their economic efficiency restricted, 
which makes them less competitive.  
The most important case regarding the impossibility of cross-border relief is the 
already referred Marks & Spencer case.
102
 As the ECJ noted in this case, the 
impossibility of offsetting profits and losses goes against the ideals of the internal 
market. In a market without internal borders as the internal market is supposed to be it 
would be important to find a solution where consolidation was allowed, recognising the 
cross-border activities of European firms across the EU territory.
103
 
Moreover, the impossibility of cross-border relief also translates into the need 
for the expensive transfer pricing system that is currently in place. The goal of the 
current transfer pricing system is to prevent that companies shift their profits between 
Member States through intra-group transfers with the purpose of reducing their taxable 
profits. Thus, intra-group transfers of values have to be priced in the same manner as 
independent companies would do in the market using an arm’s length principle. 
The transfer pricing system is very complex and costly because companies are 
required to demonstrate that they established their transfer prices on an arm’s length 
basis by supplying documentary proof, which also reduces their economic efficiency 
and competitiveness in the internal market.
104
 If groups of companies were allowed to 
consolidate their profits and losses, they would not need to transfer their profits, 
meaning that the transfer pricing system would not be necessary and European firms 
would have less compliance costs, resulting in more economic efficiency and 
competitiveness. 
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In summary, the separate-accounting allocation method that is currently in place 
is also a foe of competition. Firstly because groups of companies pay more taxes than it 
was supposed in a single market due to the impossibility of cross-border relief, reducing 
their economic efficiency and competitiveness in the internal market. Then again, this 
same impossibility of cross-border relief leads to the necessity of the transfer pricing 
system, implying substantial costs for companies fulfilling their tax obligations and 
making them less competitive and less efficient. Therefore, we may conclude that the 
impossibility of cross-border relief creates significant obstacles from a competition 
policy perspective. 
 
6. The Re-registration Process of Cars 
 
The automotive industry is another situation that illustrates the fact that taxes 
may be a serious obstacle for competition in the internal market. Under the existing 
legal framework there are major administrative and tax restrictions on the automotive 
industry that affect competition and go against the ideals of the internal market. The 
current regulatory framework does not allow moving permanently one car from one 
Member State to another without having to pass by a costly process of re-registration 
and the respective payment of a tax. This situation comprises substantial problems.
105
  
First of all, it implicates double taxation because the car which has already paid 
one tax to be registered when it was originally bought has to pay another tax to be 
registered again in another Member State.  
The second problem relates to the complex administrative procedure that this 
process involves. The financial cost of dealing with the competent administrative 
authorities is highly significant, and these extra costs should not exist in a market 
without internal borders.  
Thirdly, the re-registration process of cars moving from one Member State to 
another represents an unjustified restriction of the free movement of goods. This process 
harms cars sellers, which see the free movement of their products restricted. From a 
competition policy perspective, as Mario Monti notes, the re-registration process 
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prevents the car industry from fully exploiting economies of scale, because trade in the 
automotive industry is not as free as it was supposed to.
106 
Market participants of the 
automotive industry see their efficiency restricted by the registration tax. And this 
restriction of competition cannot be justified by reasons of public interest because it will 
not bring any benefit for the European citizen. Quite the opposite, the re-registration 
process harms the European citizens because it implies extra-costs for who intends to 
buy one car in another Member State, preventing them from exploiting the advantages 
of the internal market.  
Additionally, the re-registration process of cars increases the unfair conditions of 
competition, driving companies to comparative different situations. For instance, a 
Portuguese trucking company wishing to upgrade its automotive fleet by buying a 
(usually more cheap) truck in Germany has to pass through the costly process of re-
registering the truck in Portugal, whereas if a German competitor buys the exact same 
car it does not have to support such burden. This puts the two companies of the same 
single market in different conditions, which results in unjustified distortions of 
competition. 
As Terra and Wattel note, in addition to the re-registration tax, systems of 
vehicle taxation highly differentiated cause the same problems from a free movement of 
goods perspective
107
 as well as from a competition policy perspective. For that reason, 
approximation of vehicle taxes should also be encouraged. 
Thus, we must conclude that the re-registration process of cars moving 
permanently from one Member State to another is another situation where taxes distort 
competition. This process distorts competition in the automotive industry, because it 
restricts free trade of automobiles in the internal market, preventing car sellers from 
totally exploiting the economies of scale. In the author’s opinion, the re-registration 
process of cars is one custom duty disguised or at least a charge having an equivalent 
effect to a custom duty, which, as previously noted, is prohibited by Article 30 of the 
TFEU (see section 2). Hence, the re-registration process of cars represents an obvious 
breach of the basic EU law rules. On the other hand, the re-registration process of cars 
results in the imposition of different costs on actors of the internal market, particularly 
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on those whose economic activities highly depends of an automotive fleet, making the 
conditions of competition unfair. 
 
7.  Harmful Tax Competition 
 
Harmful tax competition is another problem that reflects the negative impact that 
taxes have on competition. First of all, it is important to note that harmful tax 
competition is one problem that does not only affect the EU Member States, but all 
countries in the world.
108
 
It is a given fact that competition is an economic phenomenon that does not only 
exist between market actors. In fact, countries also compete between themselves with 
the purpose of attracting the maximum amount of businesses and capital possible to 
their jurisdictions by granting tax benefits to that effect. However, the exaggerated use 
of these incentives can lead to serious problems.  
Taxes are not the first factor that companies consider when deciding to establish 
a new business. In a preliminary phase, companies attribute more importance to other 
factors, such as, the market characteristics (market structure, number of potential 
consumers and latest statistical data relating to the economic growth of such market), 
political and social issues (such as, the regulatory framework, political stability, labour 
costs and education levels) as well as geographical location (access to appropriate 
infrastructures, climate, etc.).
109
   
Nevertheless, after considering these preliminary issues, taxes appear right next 
on the list of factors that companies value the most when deciding to establish a new 
business.
110 
Thus, if one company finds two countries that grant the preliminary issues 
in the same terms, such company will opt to establish its business in the country that 
confers a more favourable tax regime. 
In the European Union Member States are generally able to grant access to 
similar preliminary conditions, so tax issues assume particular relevance in the 
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companies’ choice. Due to single market integration, the economies of the EU have 
become more and more integrated, which translates into a satisfactory convergence 
between the 28 Member States concerning political and social questions. In 
consequence, when companies are facing decisions of establishing new businesses in 
the internal market, taxes are a factor that assumes particular importance.  
Globalisation and the consequent reduction of barriers to trade, especially in the 
EU due to the fundamental freedoms, have increased firms’ availability to establish 
their businesses in low tax jurisdictions. Being aware of that availability during the last 
three decades countries all over the globe have increasingly granted tax benefits and 
reduced the corporate income tax rates with the intention of attracting foreign capital to 
their jurisdictions.
111
 This governmental behaviour has serious consequences from a 
competition policy perspective.  
One could think that the substantial reduction of corporate income tax rates in an 
extensive number of jurisdictions of the globe as positive outcome for competition 
because, when taxation is reduced companies have more financial resources at their 
disposal so they can be more efficient and competitive. The supporters of tax 
competition say that tax competition encourages operational efficiency and makes 
States responsive to citizen preferences. Further, they argue that tax competition leads to 
coordination through the reduction of taxation.
112
  
Not denying that a certain degree of tax competition can have positive effects, 
one cannot neglect the negative effects that an intensive and reckless tax competition 
may originate, as shown by the following example.  
If a country grants one tax benefit to attract foreign companies to its territory, the 
neighbour country may feel under pressure because it does not want to lose capital in 
favour of the first and so, grants an equivalent tax benefit. Ultimately, the tax benefits 
granted do not increase the relative benefit to invest and both countries lose their fiscal 
revenues. Both countries would be better off without the grant of the tax benefits.
113
 
This measure has a negative effect as it is a waste of public fiscal revenues as well as it 
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will result in a reduction of the social welfare. Further, this behaviour may originate a 
vicious cycle where countries grant tax benefits just to accompany their neighbours in 
hope to not lose capital in their favour, which may lead to a “fiscal degradation” and a 
“race to the bottom” where the bottom is the critical point in which the costs of granting 
the tax benefits become superior to the benefits that they were supposed to generate. In 
the end is the society that will suffer.
114
 
From a competition policy perspective it is fundamental to keep in mind that 
harmful tax competition does not only affect countries’ budgets, but also all market 
participants’ performance, as it promotes unfair conditions of competition. Tax 
competition prevents the realisation of one of the most important goals of EU law, the 
maintenance of a level playing field.
115
 Whereas some companies are subject to high 
corporate income tax rates, their direct competitors are taxed in the low tax jurisdictions 
of the Member States that joined the harmful tax competition process.  
In order to move forward with the single market integration process and ensure 
that a true level playing field is reached, it is fundamental to coordinate the rules 
regarding the grant of tax benefits and reduce tax competition. Such coordination should 
reduce the divergence of tax treatments conferred in the internal market and allow 
European firms to compete under equivalent and fair conditions. 
Harmful tax competition can create significant distortions of competition even at 
national level considering that it encourages a differentiated tax treatment between 
national and foreign businesses. As tax competition aims to attract foreign investment, 
governments grant a more favourable tax treatment to foreign businesses when 
compared to nationals. This discriminatory treatment between national and foreign 
businesses distorts competition internally. Additionally, it represents a violation of one 
of the cornerstones of the EU, the non-discrimination principle between nationals and 
foreigners. 
Harmful tax competition also creates obscurity in national tax systems. The 
intense attribution of tax benefits increases the complexity of national tax systems and 
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reduces legal certainty and transparency.
116
 The lack of legal certainty is prejudicial for 
businesses since companies do not know in which ground they will step in the future. 
Moreover, the complexity of national tax systems increases the companies’ 
administrative costs, which makes them less efficient and less competitive. 
Finally, harmful tax competition affects international trade in the sense that, as 
tax benefits are designed to attract foreign direct investment, they strongly affect the 
allocation of mobile factors across the globe.
117
 Therefore, there is the risk of a large 
share of the most mobile factors, especially capital, be concentrated in a small number 
of jurisdictions. This is prejudicial from a perspective of competition policy because, if 
the majority of capital is concentrated in the hands of few entities, they might be able to 
reduce competition, misbalancing the adequate and fair distribution of capital across the 
globe. 
In conclusion, harmful tax competition is a serious problem from a competition 
policy perspective, as it affects the level playing field, the international trade, and the 
States’ budgets, instigates lack of legal certainty and promotes obscurity. The reckless 
use of tax benefits constitutes a serious obstacle to fair competition. As a consequence, 
tax policy makers should be focused on reaching a solution to solve this problem, which 
will certainly pass through the creation of rules coordinating the grant of tax benefits in 
the internal market.  
As this problem does not only affect EU Member States, but also all countries in 
the world, many attempts have been made to solve this problem by the several 
international organisms. Amongst the organisms that sought to provide solutions for this 
problem, the OECD is the one that has devoted the most serious efforts. The OECD 
started the debate in 1998 through the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices.
118
 Several 
reports were issued from this Forum and the consequence was the elimination of 
numerous harmful tax measures.
119
 In the European context there was an attempt to 
solve the problem of harmful tax competition, involving the creation of the Code of 
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Conduct for Business Taxation, a soft law instrument that also allowed identifying and 
eliminating several harmful tax measures in the internal market. Nevertheless, tax 
competition continues to exist in the internal market and additional efforts should be 
made. 
 
8.  Exit Taxes 
 
According to Diana Silva, exit taxes are pecuniary contributions required, either 
to individuals or legal entities that transfer their residence from the home State to the 
host State.
120
 Exit taxes can thus be levied on both individuals and legal entities, 
however, only the latter will be focused on this essay. 
When there is a transfer or residence of legal entities from the home State to the 
host State, the home State will lose the power to tax the income generated during the 
period of residence in its territory. Thus, in order to preserve the latent tax revenue, the 
home States charge exit taxes, which aim taxing that income, ensuring the tax revenue 
that the home State hoped to receive.
121
  
The problem is that the rules on exit taxation frequently set a less favourable 
treatment for the entities that transfer their residence to the host State when compared to 
the ones that stay in the home State. In order to dissuade companies from re-establishing 
their businesses, the home State usually levies disproportionate taxes. Thus, exit taxes 
have a strong dissuasive effect and restrict the freedom of establishment foreseen in the 
TFEU.
122
  
With this biased treatment for the entities that transfer their residence to the host 
State when compared to the ones that stay in the home State, exit taxes make 
competition unfair. Companies re-establishing their businesses into other jurisdiction 
have to support extra-costs when compared to their competitors that stay in the home 
State. Thus, exit taxes distort competition. Additionally, exit taxes prevent European 
firms from fully exploiting the advantages that the internal market is supposed to 
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confer. Exit taxes dissuade companies to re-establish their businesses in jurisdictions 
that confer more favourable conditions (political, social, geographical, etc.) for the 
development of their economic activities, preventing them to become more competitive. 
Hence, exit taxes reduce competition in the internal market, being a foe. 
Therefore, one can conclude that exit taxation represents another situation where 
taxes act against the main goals of competition policy. This is one problem that derives 
from tax competition. In order to avoid losing capital to their neighbours, Member 
States usually seek to dissuade companies from re-establishing their businesses by 
charging heavy taxes. As a consequence, exit taxes go against the main purposes of EU 
competition law. Firstly, exit taxes imply unfair competition, because they make 
companies that want to re-establish their businesses have to support extra-costs when 
compared to their competitors that remain in the home State. On the other hand, by 
dissuading European firms from re-establishing their businesses in the jurisdictions that 
could grant more favourable conditions for the development of their economic 
activities, exit taxes prevent European firms from being entirely competitive, reducing 
competition in the internal market. 
 
9.  Base Erosion Profit Shifting and Tax Aid Cases 
 
Currently, there are more than a few cases under the European Commission 
scrutiny that can be a good example of how certain tax measures can breach competition 
policy purposes, involving the erosion of tax bases, shifting of income and tax aids.  
For years, multinational companies like Apple, Amazon, Facebook, Google, 
Starbucks and hundreds of others have developed complex tax planning, involving the 
creation of holding companies and subsidiaries in the European Union,
123
 in order to 
minimise their tax obligations and consequently obtain a comparative advantage over 
their competitors. 
Only recently, however, these cases have received proper attention by the 
competent authorities, much as a result of the financial crisis lived in the EU, which 
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increased the need for Member States to consolidate their budgets. Recent 
investigations made by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalist also 
drawn attention by leaking a vast number of documents that prove that Member States 
of the European Union like the Luxembourg and Ireland have celebrated illegal tax 
agreements with some of the world’s largest multinational companies (the so-called 
Luxembourg Leaks).  
Countries like the US, the UK and France supported for years the process of 
globalisation as it promotes economic growth, creates jobs and fosters innovation. 
However, such countries are now recognising that global operations have been used by 
a vast number of multinational companies as a way to substantially reduce their tax 
obligations, increase their profits and acquire an illegitimate advantage over their 
competitors, affecting thus competition.
124
  
Multinational companies have established their international headquarters in 
Member States of the EU that confer a much more favourable corporate income tax 
when compared than their original country. The 12.5% corporate income tax applicable 
in Ireland, for instance, is much more attractive than the 35% corporate income tax rate 
applied in the US.
125
  
Additionally, these multinational companies earn profits in several countries, for 
instance in the UK or France, and then transfer the revenues to their headquarters, which 
are based in low-tax jurisdictions like Ireland, Luxembourg and Netherlands. Thus, the 
profits made by these multinational companies are only taxed (at low tax rates) in the 
Member States where such companies established their headquarters.  
These multinational companies take advantage of the existing loopholes of 
bilateral tax treaties to shift their profits to low tax jurisdictions, which results in double 
non-taxation or less than single taxation.
126
 By evading taxes, these companies reduce 
their normal costs and obtain an unfair advantage over their competitors that adequately 
satisfy their tax obligations. 
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The UK and France are the Member States that have revealed more concern 
about the aggressive tax planning adopted by those companies. Actually, the UK is 
considering the creation of the so-called “Google tax”, a tax which aims preventing the 
losses of the UK tax revenues caused by the aggressive tax planning practiced by such 
multinational companies, by targeting intra-group payments.
127
 
While this aggressive tax planning can be disapproved from a moral point of 
view, it is important to note that it is not illegal under the current legal framework, 
supposing that the companies established in the EU actually perform genuine economic 
activities in the jurisdiction where they have their headquarters established.
128
 These 
multinational companies usually perform small activities of their businesses like 
marketing, for example, in low-tax jurisdictions and argue that they perform a genuine 
economic activity and therefore should be taxed accordingly to the tax system of such 
jurisdiction. 
The aggressive tax planning practiced by several multinational companies does 
not only involve the shifting of income and the erosion of tax bases, but also tax 
agreements with Member States where they established their headquarters to reduce the 
applicable taxes. It is here that the “tax optimisation” practiced by these multinational 
companies may have become illegal, as such individual negotiation of the applicable 
taxes with the competent authorities may constitute prohibited tax aid in the meaning of 
Article 107(1) of the TFEU.  
The cases that have received more attention are the tax rulings applied by Ireland 
to Apple, the tax rulings applied by Luxembourg to Fiat and Amazon and the tax rulings 
applied by the Netherlands to Starbucks. All these Member States are under the 
Commission state aid investigation to analyse if they granted prohibited tax aid.  
The European Commission is investigating the transfer pricing agreements, also 
known as advanced pricing agreements, established between the Member States and the 
referred multinational companies, which are liable to confer a selective economic 
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advantage to the latter. As it was noted earlier, under the present method of transfer 
pricing using an arm’s length principle, intra-group transfers of values have to be priced 
in the same manner as independent companies would do in the market. The transfer 
prices are normally calculated under a pre-determined set of criteria. The advanced 
pricing agreements allegedly celebrated between the multinational companies and the 
EU Member States establish the application of a more favourable set of criteria for the 
determination of the prices of intra-group commercial transactions.
129
 These transfer 
pricing agreements involve the low or non-taxation of royalties, intellectual property 
rights, and loan interests. Such agreements confer a selective economic advantage to 
these companies as the prices established for these intra-group transactions will 
automatically be accepted by the tax authority of the country that celebrates the transfer 
pricing agreement.
130
 The taxes paid by such companies are thus much lower than 
would be under normal conditions, which creates considerable distortions of 
competition.  
Since June 2013, the Commission has been investigating under state aid rules the 
tax ruling practice of seven Member States (Belgium, Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Malta, the Netherlands and the UK). Further, by the end of 2014 the Commission 
enlarged the enquiry about tax ruling practice under EU state aid rules to cover all 
Member States. The Commission will ask Member States to provide detailed 
information about their tax rulings practice, in particular to confirm whether they 
provide tax rulings and a list of all companies that have received a tax ruling from 2010 
to 2013.
131
   
The fact the current President of the European Commission, Jean Claude 
Juncker, was the responsible for the numerous tax rulings provided by the Luxembourg 
during the last two decades, however, raised some suspicious about the European 
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Commission integrity to really solve this problem. Further developments to maintain the 
level playing field are expected.
132
 
The analysis made in this section shows that certain multinational companies 
have been taking advantage of national tax systems resorting to aggressive tax planning 
in order to reduce their tax burdens and obtain an economic advantage over their 
competitors. This situation represents serious distortions of competition. For that reason, 
it is essential from a competition policy perspective to reduce the possibilities that these 
companies have to evade taxes by reducing the number of loopholes in tax legislations 
and increasing transparency and tax cooperation. The G20 has already granted support 
to the OECD initiative on base erosion profit shifting (BEPS), which will be further 
explained in Part IV. 
 
10.  Interim Conclusions 
 
 This second Part of the study clearly states how taxes can be a strong foe of 
competition. Taxes are a tool that governments have at their disposal to influence the 
market participants’ behaviour.  
In some cases taxes can be used to protect certain domestic companies, as it is 
the case of custom duties and tax aids. The downside of these taxes is that they may 
severely restrict competition and international trade. Therefore, the use of these two 
instruments is rigorously regulated both at WTO and EU levels in order to avoid their 
harmful effects. 
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granted tax rulings without effectively evaluating whether the companies income has been accrued in or 
derived from outside Gibraltar.
132
 In fact, this is not the first time that the Gibraltar tax system is under the 
Commission scrutiny under the state aid rules, before the investigation of 2001 in respect of a specific tax 
regime exempting companies without any trade or business in Gibraltar and not owned by Gibraltar 
residents from corporate tax. Also in 2004 the Commission concluded that a proposed tax reform by the 
UK applicable to all companies in Gibraltar consisting of a payroll tax, a business property occupation tax 
and a registration fee was in breach of state aid rules. See the European Commission Press release 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-1073_en.htm [05/01/2015]. 
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Conversely, most of the remaining situations analysed here, like the application 
of different tax rules throughout the internal market, the impossibility of cross-border 
relief, the harmful tax competition, exit taxes and the aggressive tax planning that 
results in base erosion and profit shifting are issues that are not adequately regulated at 
EU level and significantly affect competition. In all these cases, taxes act as a serious 
foe of competition, preventing the achievement of some of the most important goals of 
competition policy. All these situations exist due to the lack of political consensus in the 
European Union regarding the coordination of national tax provisions.  
Therefore, a major political effort must be made in order to achieve some 
coordination on direct taxation. Otherwise, taxes will continue to represent a strong 
obstacle to competition in the internal market, harming European companies, the 
European economy and ultimately the European society. All the efforts should be 
concentrated in the adoption of new solutions that can change the legal status quo. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that the success of such solutions will require a 
strong political commitment. 
Even at national level, each Member State can individually implement measures 
that contribute to reduce the obstacles that taxes imply on competition. The core 
examples would be the elimination of national provisions imposing the re-registration 
process of cars and the end of individual tax rulings in favour of certain companies. The 
elimination of the re-registration process of cars would immediately increase 
competition in the automotive industry. On the other and, the end of individual tax 
rulings in favour of multinational companies would contribute to balance the level 
playing field in the internal market. None of these measures is dependent of the 
unanimity rule or of any political consensus. 
There are numerous situations where taxes are a foe and a strong obstacle from a 
competition policy perspective. The European economy demands a shift where taxes are 
not responsible for making its companies so less competitive, efficient and innovative 
on one hand, and where equality of conditions of competition is fostered. Accordingly, 
in the last Part of this essay the author will indicate the path that in his opinion should 
be pursued in order to correct the situations where taxes constitute an obstacle for 
competition. The obstacles that taxes represent for competition can and should be 
reduced.  
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PART III - TAXES AS AN ALLY OF COMPETITION 
 
1. General Context 
 
This third Part is not as extensive as the previous one, possibly because the 
positive impact that taxes have on competition is not as palpable as the negative impact. 
Whereas we can easily find situations where taxes represent an obstacle to competition, 
a more elaborated analysis is necessary to find situations where taxes act as an ally. 
Still, throughout this third Part the author will show some evidences of how taxes must 
not always be considered a foe of competition, as sometimes they are truly an ally. 
 Even though taxation frequently constitutes an obstacle to competition, it is also 
true that the tax system is a valuable tool that governments have at their disposal to 
satisfy the main purposes of competition policy, specially, foster competition, ensure 
the maintenance of the level playing field, correct market failures and protect all market 
participants. The value that taxes can have from a competition policy perspective must 
not be overrated.  
Taxes can indeed act as a true ally of competition. That is the case, for instance, 
of taxes that foster competition in monopolistic markets, a well targeted imposition of 
custom duties, the transfer pricing rules, tax regimes that encourage R&D and 
innovation (e.g., patent boxes), environmental taxes and taxes that stimulate the creation 
of new jobs. Each of these taxes will be analysed in terms of the positive effects that 
they can bring from a competition policy perspective. 
After that, the author will conclude that tax coordination is the key to reduce the 
obstacles that taxes often constitute for competition by observing the advantages that 
the VAT coordination brought. This is an excellent example that shows how taxation in 
the internal market does not have to be a factor responsible for distorting competition. 
VAT coordination had a really positive impact from a competition policy perspective 
because, as this tax is imposed on the sale of every product, it has a high potential to 
influence the supply and demand and consequently competition. 
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2. Taxes That Foster Competition in Monopolistic Markets 
 
Taxes that foster competition in monopolistic markets are a good example that 
taxes can be a valuable ally of competition. The equivalent term used for monopoly in 
EU competition law is dominant position. Companies may obtain a dominant position in 
a given market. According to the ECJ, “the dominant position referred to [in Article 102 
of the TFEU] relates to a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking 
which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant 
market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its 
competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers”.133  
It should be mentioned that Article 102 covers the dominance of the market by a 
single firm (monopoly) but also collective dominance, i.e., oligopolistic markets under 
the head of collective or joint dominance by more than one firm. Dominant position is 
thus one situation in which one company, or a group of companies acting together, own 
all or nearly all of the market resulting in the absence of competition. Some indicators 
that a company has dominant position are the percentage of market share (usually a 
market share of 50% is synonym of significant market power but this presumption is 
rebuttable), vertical integration and developed distribution systems, product 
differentiation, superior technology, the ownership of intellectual property rights, 
economic performance and previous findings of dominance. 
It is important to bear in mind that a dominant position is not forbidden under 
EU competition law inasmuch as it is not an anti-competitive practice on its own. What 
is forbidden is the abuse of dominance. Unfair prices (predatory prices or selective price 
cutting), limited production (reduction of the output to increase the prices above the 
competitive level), inferior products and exclusion of trading partners (exclusive dealing 
agreements or refusals to supply) are all examples of practices that characterise an abuse 
of dominant position.
134 
Therefore, the abuse of dominant position creates serious 
problems for the society.
135
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 Case 27/76, Judgment of the Court, 14 February 1978, United Brands v. European Commission, 
paragraph 65. 
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 For further developments see Richard Whish and David Bailey, “Competition Law”, Oxford 
University Press, 7
th
 Edition, 2012, pages 201 et seq. See also José Ribeiro Brazuna, “Defesa da 
Concorrência e Tributação - à luz do Artigo 146-A da Constituição”, op. cit., pages 95 et seq. 
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 There are several reasons that can prevent other companies from joining the dominated market, such 
as, the dominant company being protected by the State ,the fact that the dominant company practices 
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Governments may intervene to prevent free markets from being dominated by 
one single company. The number of measures available to solve this problem is 
relatively broad, but keeping in mind the scope of the thesis, the author will only refer 
the ones that have a tax nature. 
Through the tax system, governments can intervene and promote the entrance of 
new competitors or strengthen the position of small competitors in dominated markets, 
changing the market structure in order to avoid the harmful effects that the absence of 
competition in such market has for all market participants.  
Taxes can be a really useful tool in the process of adjusting the market structure 
in accordance with the public interest. For a given market, if 70% of the market share is 
held by a single company whom abuses of its dominant position, and there are two other 
companies with 15% of market share each, it can be important from a competition 
perspective to grant tax incentives to the smaller companies. This measure would 
promote their efficiency and growth, allowing them to absorb part of the market share 
of the dominant company. The dominant company would no longer act independently in 
the market and perform abusive practices that harm other market participants like 
producers, distributors, sellers and consumers. In this case, the tax system acts as an 
ally, fostering competition, encouraging the defence of all market participants as well as 
the correction of a market failure. 
There are different tax measures that governments can adopt to prosecute that 
task such as granting tax exemptions, tax deferrals, tax credits or tax allowances in 
favour of the smaller companies. In the given example tax allowances would probably 
be the best measure that one government could adopt because tax allowances are the 
incentive that better suits small companies. According to the OECD, tax credits are only 
a good incentive for companies that have major tax liabilities. Since smaller companies 
in principle do not have significant tax liabilities they may benefit more from the 
reduction of their tax base (through allowances) than from the reduction of their tax 
liabilities.
136
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
prices so low that one competitor could not accompany, the lack of access to the necessary resources or 
even the absence of required licenses.  
136
 OECD, “Tax Incentives for Research and Development: Trends and Issues”, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/science/inno/2498389.pdf [04/04/2015], page 28. 
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It is true that such governmental conduct could be regarded as tax aid in the 
meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU. However, such tax aid would certainly be 
allowed by the European Commission in the context of the exceptions to the general 
prohibition of state aid established in Articles 107(2) and 107(3), since such aid would 
guarantee the satisfaction of the public interest, in particular, the defence of all market 
participants, including the European citizen. 
 The present description makes evident that taxes can be a true ally of 
competition. By fostering competition in monopolistic markets through the tax system, 
governments can reduce the market power of dominant firms that perform abusive 
practices, preventing them from acting independently in the market, safeguarding the 
interest of all market participants. Taxes are indeed an ally of competition. 
 
3. Custom Duties 
 
 Without prejudice of what was said in Part II and keeping in mind that the 
irresponsible use of custom duties might constitute a serious obstacle to competition, 
they might also perform the role of an ally. 
 As previously discussed, custom duties are a tool that allows governments to 
control the flow of goods. Whether it is true that the massive imposition of custom 
duties on imported goods affects competition and international trade, it is also true that a 
precise imposition of custom duties may have a positive impact. 
A wise and well targeted imposition of custom duties may have positive effects 
from an EU competition policy perspective. Namely, charging custom duties on goods 
produced outside the internal market, in particular in countries that practice social 
dumping
137
 (like China, India, Mexico, etc.) is a measure that can contribute to make 
competition fairer. Even though this measure affects international trade, actually it 
contributes to balance competition in the internal market. 
                                                          
137 Social dumping can be defined as “the practice, undertaken by self-interested market participants, of 
undermining or evading existing social regulations with the aim of gaining a competitive advantage”. See 
Magdalena Bernaciak, in “Social Dumping and the EU integration process”, Working Paper 2014.06, 
European Trade Union Institute. 
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As the European Union is built on a social model, it has high standards in what 
concerns workers’ protection such as, minimum wages and limits of weekly working 
hours.
138
 For that reason, it is very difficult for European firms to compete with foreign 
players that do not obey such standards and aim to sell their products in the internal 
market. Those external companies do not guarantee the adequate conditions to their 
workers, so they have lower production costs and can practice extremely low prices. 
Social dumping results therefore in unfair competition.  
To avoid European firms and competition in the internal market being harmed 
by social dumping, a well targeted imposition of a custom duty on products coming 
from those external countries is a measure that has a positive impact from an EU 
competition policy perspective as it can balance competition. 
It is true that in that case European firms are being protected from foreign 
competitors. However, it would be legitimate to do so because, whereas European firms 
have to support the normal costs of granting an adequate treatment to their workers, 
their external competitors play under different rules that allow them to reduce their 
production costs by treating their workers poorly. This competitive advantage is unfair 
from a European perspective and it is adequate to impose custom duties on goods 
produced in those foreign countries.  
It would not be fair nor reasonable for European firms to be obliged to respect 
high standards of workers’ protection (which must be maintained to ensure the social 
welfare) and simultaneously make them compete with foreign companies that have very 
low production costs due to social dumping, which results in unfair competition. Thus, 
custom duties can make competition fairer and ensure that European firms are not 
harmed by the foreign competitors that do not respect the minimum legal standards of 
the internal market. 
Therefore, one must conclude that a precise imposition of custom duties on 
certain goods produced outside the internal market has positive effects from an EU 
competition policy perspective. What distinguishes a wise from a thoughtless 
imposition is the reason underlying such imposition. If the purpose is avoiding unfair 
competition, social dumping and ensuring the protection of the workers’ rights, the 
imposition of custom duties must be considered wise and positive from a competition 
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policy perspective. Conversely, the indiscriminate imposition of custom duties on any 
good that comes from the outside of the internal market, irrespectively of whether the 
country of origin of such goods obeys the minimum standards of the internal market, 
constitutes a serious obstacle and a restriction of competition as we have observed in 
Part II (section 2). Thus, we shall conclude that custom duties might also be an ally of 
competition. 
 
4. The Transfer Pricing Rules 
 
The transfer pricing rules that are currently in force represent another situation 
where the tax system acts as an ally of competition. Even though this system implies 
high administrative costs for EU-based companies (due to the documentary proof that it 
requires), the truth is that it promotes fair competition. Transfer pricing refers to the 
terms and conditions surrounding transactions (of goods, services and capital) within a 
multinational company. It concerns the prices charged between associated enterprises 
established in different countries for their intra-group transactions.
139
 Due to 
globalisation and expansion of international trade, multinational companies have been 
adopting business strategies that involve the creation of subsidiaries and branches 
throughout different countries. As a rule, each affiliated company is taxed separately by 
the country in which it operates.
140
 
Today, the majority of cross border trade that occurs is between related 
companies, which constitutes a huge concern for tax authorities.
141
 Companies 
frequently use transfer prices as an allocation method. Since the transfer prices are set 
by non-independent associates within the multinational, multinational entities may set 
transfer prices on cross-border transactions to reduce taxable profits in their 
jurisdiction.
142
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As the main purpose of companies is to maximise their overall profits, they 
frequently try to allocate their profits through transfer prices to low tax jurisdictions so 
as to reduce their tax obligations, thus acquiring advantage over their competitors. 
Hence, transfer pricing mechanism is a tool that corporations use in order to avoid high 
taxation in certain jurisdictions.
143
  
The transfer pricing rules that are currently in place appear as a solution to avoid 
that companies unlawfully reduce their tax obligation and consequently obtain a 
comparative advantage over their competitors that rightfully fulfil their tax obligations, 
distorting competition. 
Under the present transfer pricing system, intra-group transfers of values have to 
be priced in the same manner as independent companies would do in the market using 
an arm’s length principle.144 Rules and procedures applicable to transfer pricing are 
usually found in the domestic law of many countries.
145
 By setting the prices to be 
applied between intra-group transfers and making affiliated enterprises treat themselves 
as independent, tax administrations avoid that companies allocate their profits to low tax 
jurisdictions. In other words, the transfer pricing rules ensure that all market actors pay 
their due taxes, preventing certain companies from shifting their profits to low tax 
jurisdictions, ensuring fair competition. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the transfer pricing system is one ally of 
competition. By enforcing that all companies pay their rightfully due taxes, it avoids 
distortions of competition. The transfer pricing rules prevent that certain companies 
acquire a tax advantage over their competitors by allocating their profits to low tax 
jurisdictions, ensuring the maintenance of the level playing field in the internal market. 
Thus, even though the transfer pricing system involves high compliance costs both for 
EU-based firms and tax administrations, the reality is that it ensures fair competition.  
                                                          
143
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5.  Tax Incentives to Research and Development 
 
  Research and Development (R&D) activities can be defined as “creative work 
undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including 
knowledge of man, culture and society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise 
new applications”.146  
The development of R&D activities is fundamental from a competition policy as 
it results in more innovation, increased productivity and consequently more 
competition. Accordingly, Article 179(1) of the TFEU establishes that R&D is one 
objective of common interest. Further, R&D activities are closely connected with the 
Europe 2020 strategy,
147
 which intends to increase growth in the EU by making it a 
smart, sustainable and inclusive economy. 
 However, without governmental actions, the market alone will not invest what is 
desirable in R&D. The society collects significant benefits from R&D activities even 
though it is the company investing in R&D that has to support all the costs involved. 
These spill-over effects make companies reluctant to invest in R&D activities because 
the company has to support alone all the costs associated to R&D, whereas the society 
collects the major benefits.
148
 In spite of companies investing in R&D can expect to 
collect some benefits (such as lower production costs and increased revenues) private 
investors are reluctant to invest in R&D, particularly when there is uncertainty about the 
success of such investments.
149
  
Ergo, in the absence of governmental actions, the level of investment in R&D is 
below what is desirable, resulting in less innovation and less competition. To correct 
this market failure, governments had to find solutions. One of the most efficient 
solutions is to encourage the investment in R&D activities through the tax system. By 
relieving the tax liability of undertakings developing R&D activities, governments 
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stimulate them to keep investing in R&D, which results in more competition, 
innovation, better products, increased efficiency and more jobs, some of the most 
important goals of the competition policy. 
 One strategy adopted by several Member States of the European Union is the 
patent box. The patent box, also known as innovation box, is a special tax regime that 
stimulates R&D offering a substantially reduced corporate tax for income derived from 
patents and other forms of intellectual properties.
150
 This way, patent boxes stimulate 
competition and innovation, being a true ally of competition. 
Belgium, Cyprus, France, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom are some of the Member States 
that created patent boxes. It is possible to find some differences between country 
practices. Some exempt part of the income or allow for a notional deduction of part of 
the IP income, whereas others explicitly stipulate a separate tax rate for IP income.
151
 
But in spite of the differences, the reality is that all of them grant a tax break to 
intellectual property revenues, stimulating innovation and competition in the internal 
market. 
 Therefore, one must conclude that taxes can be indeed a valuable ally to 
stimulate R&D and consequently competition and innovation in the internal market. 
The patent boxes that are currently in force are one excellent example of that. By 
offering substantially reduced corporate tax for income derived from R&D, patents and 
other forms of intellectual property rights, governments stimulate competition and 
innovation, which proves that taxes may be an ally of competition. 
 
6.  Tax Benefits for the Creation of Jobs 
 
 The financial crisis lived in the EU during the last years increased substantially 
the unemployment rates in several Member States.
152
 High unemployment rates are 
against the main purposes of competition policy because they make national economies 
                                                          
150
 Lisa Evers, Helen Miller, and Christoph Spengel, “Intellectual Property Box Regimes: Effective Tax 
Rates and Tax Policy Considerations”, Centre for European Economic Research, Discussion Paper No. 
13-070, November 2013, page 1. 
151
 Ibid. Page 6. 
152
 Especially in Cyprus, Croatia, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain. 
   
86 
weaker, reducing competitiveness, efficiency and innovation. Thus, the creation of new 
jobs is now one of the top priorities of the European competition policy. 
Recently, the European Commission announced a €315 billion Investment Plan 
to be applied in the 2015-2017 period, aiming to get Europe growing and get more 
people employed.
153
 This plan is expected to create 1.3 million jobs in the internal 
market, fostering competition and innovation. The money is supposed to be invested in 
strategic areas for Europe like, energy, transport, broadband, education, research and 
innovation. Tax benefits may play a key role in the execution of this project as they may 
be used as a channel to inject financial resources in the economy.  
The grant of tax benefits is probably the most efficient and transparent way to 
channel the investment into the economy. Such tax benefits however must be carefully 
designed to avoid undue distortions of competition by ensuring that they are granted in 
the most transparent and equitable way possible.  
Tax benefits for the creation of new businesses and for companies hiring new 
employees are suitable incentives to reduce the unemployment rates across the EU and 
consequently increase productivity, efficiency and competition in the internal market. In 
fact, the receivers of those tax benefits may get a selective economic advantage over 
their competitors within the meaning of Article 107(1), but this tax aid can be justified 
by reasons of public interest. A judgement of proportionality will lead us to the 
conclusion that the positive effects of this governmental intervention (creation of new 
jobs, increased productivity, competitiveness and innovation in the internal market as 
well as the development of strategic areas for Europe like, energy, transport, broadband, 
education, research and innovation) outweigh the negative effects (affecting free 
competition). Such tax aid would certainly fall within the exceptions to the general 
prohibition of state aid foreseen on Article 107(2) and 107(3).  
To sum up, the tax system can be a very useful tool to put the new Investment 
Plan in practice. Granting tax reliefs, such as tax exemptions or tax allowances, in 
favour of companies hiring new employees is an efficient way to channel the money of 
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the Investment Plan. Therefore, there is no doubt that in this case the tax system can 
also act as a true ally of competition, contributing to create more jobs and consequently 
making the European economy more dynamic, efficient, competitive and innovative, 
some of the fundamental aims of competition policy. 
 
7.  Environmental Taxes 
 
 Environmental taxes represent another situation where taxes can act as an ally of 
competition. Firstly, environmental taxes can balance competition in the internal market 
by eliminating an unfair comparative advantage that certain external competitors have 
when compared to European firms. On the other hand, environmental taxes help attain 
the ultimate purpose of competition policy, the society welfare, through the correction 
of a market failure. 
 Primarily, environmental taxes can promote fair competition in the internal 
market by eliminating the comparative advantage that certain external competitors have 
when compared with European firms for not having to respect the minimum standards 
of environmental protection established in EU law.  
Environmental protection is currently one of the most important concerns of the 
European Union. The Treaty on the European Union establishes that Member States 
shall promote a sustainable use of the environment.
154
 As a consequence, EU-based 
firms have to respect high standards of environmental protection, which naturally 
increases their production costs. 
The fact that certain foreign companies that sell their products in the internal 
market do not have to fulfil the same environmental standards makes competition in the 
internal market unfair. As those companies do not have to obey the same standards, they 
have lower production costs, which confers them a comparative advantage. Therefore, 
environmental dumping results in unfair competition. 
Just like custom duties, environmental taxes can be used to ensure that European 
firms are not harmed by foreign competitors that practice environmental dumping. Here, 
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there is a valid reason to protect European firms because, whereas they have to support 
the natural costs of protecting the environment, their external competitors play under 
different rules that allow them to reduce their production costs. As this competitive 
advantage is totally unfair from an EU competition policy perspective, it is adequate to 
increase the price of goods coming from those external countries through environmental 
taxes, ensuring that European firms are not harmed by environmental dumping. 
 It would not be reasonable to make European firms respect high environmental 
standards and simultaneously make them compete directly with companies that are able 
to produce extremely cheap products due to environmental dumping. Therefore, there is 
no doubt that in this case taxes are a true ally of competition because they guarantee that 
the competition in the internal market is not distorted by the environmental dumping 
practiced outside the EU, ensuring the maintenance of the level playing field. 
On the other hand, environmental taxes can help attaining the ultimate purpose 
of competition policy, the society welfare, through the correction of a market failure. By 
taxing the emission of carbon dioxide, giving application to the polluter pays principle, 
environmental taxes correct a market failure because in the absence of such tax, the 
polluter would impose a cost on the society (the detriment of the environment) and 
would not pay for it.
155
  
In addition to taxing environmentally harmful actions, the tax system can also be 
used to encourage environmentally beneficial actions. For instance, the grant of a tax 
benefit in favour of electric car producers is a measure that has a positive impact 
because it protects the environment and additionally stimulates innovation in the 
automotive industry. 
In conclusion, environmental taxes are a strong ally of competition. First and 
most importantly, they guarantee the maintenance of the level playing field in the 
internal market by ensuring that European firms are not harmed by the environmental 
dumping practiced by their external competitors. On the other hand, environmental 
taxes help attain the ultimate purpose of competition policy that is the society welfare, 
through the correction of a market failure. Additionally, environmental taxes can 
stimulate (green) innovation, which is another important purpose of competition policy. 
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For all these reasons, one must conclude that environmental taxes are a true ally of 
competition. 
 
8.  Excise Duties on Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 
 
 Excise duties on alcoholic beverages and tobacco deserve a special mention 
because their effects are controversial. There is no consensus among specialists about 
whether excise duties on alcohol and tobacco have a positive or negative impact. Even 
though excise duties are not a pure ally of competition, because they do not foster 
competition, the truth is that these excise duties are in line with the ultimate purpose of 
competition policy, inasmuch as they correct a market failure.  
Excise duties are taxes that increase the original price of the respective goods. 
As a consequence, excise duties on alcoholic beverages and tobacco modify the natural 
consumer behaviour, discouraging the purchase of such goods. Some authors consider 
that excise duties have a negative impact because they interfere with the normal balance 
of the market, affecting the law of supply and demand in the industries of alcoholic 
beverages and tobacco.  
The author, however, does not think that excise duties represent an undue 
distortion of competition. It is true that excise duties on alcoholic beverages and tobacco 
affect the freedom of the market in the respective industries. Still, such restriction of 
competition shall not be regarded as negative if we think either from a legal or from a 
social perspective.  
The consumption of alcohol and tobacco creates a negative externality because it 
originates harmful effects for public health. In the absence of excise duties on alcohol 
and tobacco there would be a market failure because the consumers of these goods 
would be able to impose a cost on the society (reducing public health) without having to 
pay for it. Thus, excise duties serve to correct this market failure and safeguard the 
society welfare, the ultimate goal of competition policy. 
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Furthermore, it is convenient to note that the imposition of excise duties on 
alcoholic beverages and tobacco is coordinated at European level.
156
 Article 113 of the 
TEU establishes indirect taxes in the European Union, including excise duties, shall be 
harmonised in order to avoid distortions of competition. Thus, in 1992 the EU adopted 
the Horizontal Directive,
157
 which coordinates the application of excise duties on 
alcoholic beverages and tobacco in the internal market, preventing substantial 
modifications of the prices of these goods. 
Even though excise duties on alcohol and tobacco affect free competition and 
the supply and demand of the respective goods, one must conclude that they are totally 
in line with the ultimate purpose of EU competition law, in particular, the correction of 
a market failure in accordance with the public interest. Excise duties on alcohol and 
tobacco are expected to reduce the negative effects that the consumption of these goods 
creates for the society in general. Therefore, even though these excise duties are not a 
pure ally of competition, they are not a foe inasmuch as they are in line with the 
ultimate purpose of competition policy. 
 
9.  The VAT Coordination 
 
As it was previously referred (Part I, section 6), the legal status quo in the 
European Union is characterised by a problematic lack of tax coordination that involves 
serious problems from the perspective of competition policy Indirect taxation is the 
exception to that rule.
158
 Article 113 of the TEU provides that “[t]he Council shall (…) 
adopt provisions for the harmonisation of legislation concerning turnover taxes, excise 
duties and other forms of indirect taxation to the extent that such harmonisation is 
necessary to ensure the establishment and the functioning of the internal market and to 
avoid distortion of competition” (emphasis added). Thus, indirect taxation is the one of 
the few areas of European tax law that can be characterised by a satisfactory degree of 
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coordination
159
 and is an excellent example that taxation does not have to be a factor 
responsible for distorting competition in the internal market.  
Tax coordination is fundamental to maintain the level playing field in the 
internal market. Only by giving European firms the possibility to compete under the 
same conditions and by granting that all of them are subject to the same tax burdens we 
can say that taxes do not affect competition. Thence VAT coordination being a good 
example that taxation in the internal market does not have to be a synonym of 
distortions of competition. 
The current legal framework encompasses several directives on VAT which 
regulate among other things, the range of tax rates permitted, the procedure of VAT 
refund and the determination of the tax base.
160
 In other words, the most important 
aspects of indirect taxation are properly coordinated in legally binding instruments. It 
should be noted that this also means that EU Member States already do not have total 
fiscal sovereignty. 
VAT coordination represents a major step in the single market integration 
process and brought significant advantages for competition, in particular, the promotion 
of equal conditions of competition and the facilitation of the free movement of goods 
within the internal market, which is essential to make the internal market more 
competitive. 
VAT coordination is fundamental from a competition policy perspective because 
indirect taxes may be a more visible obstacle to competition than direct taxes. VAT 
performs a decisive role in the competition process because, as it is imposed on the sale 
of all products, it can seriously influence the supply and demand of certain goods as 
well as of its complementary goods. The imposition of different VATs across the 
internal market would represent a strong obstacle to fair competition as the price of all 
products across the internal market would be artificially modified by each Member 
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State.
161
 For that reason, VAT coordination is extremely positive from a competition 
policy perspective. 
Corporate income taxation is equally important to make competition fairer. As it 
has been described above, the lack of tax coordination in the internal market, especially 
in what concerns the corporate income tax, is one of the factors that contribute most for 
the existence distortions of competition. Thus, in the author’s opinion the achievements 
on VAT coordination should function as an inspiration for direct taxation.  
Even though up to date it was not possible to reach significant agreements about 
direct taxation, this is an indispensable step to ensure the maintenance of the level 
playing field in the internal market. It is well known that it is not possible to achieve full 
tax harmonisation immediately,
162
 especially in what concerns the applicable tax rates, 
but there are other aspects that should be coordinated to promote fair conditions of 
competition in the internal market, such as administrative and accounting rules.  
Any type of tax coordination is fundamental and represents a major step to 
promote fair competition considering that tax coordination allows European firms to 
compete under equivalent conditions in what is expected to be a market without internal 
borders. If the market does not have internal borders, companies acting in such market 
cannot receive a differentiated tax treatment accordingly to the jurisdiction where they 
have their headquarters established. Thus, the VAT coordination shows that taxation in 
the internal market does not have necessarily to be a synonym of distortions of 
competition. 
 
10.  Interim Conclusions 
 
 The analysis made so far shows that taxes shall not only be regarded as a foe of 
competition. Throughout this Part several situations were presented where taxes 
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perform the role of a true ally, helping attain some of the most important goals of 
competition policy.  
Firstly, it was observed that taxes can play a decisive role in stimulating 
competition in monopolistic markets, helping to prevent the harmful effects that an 
abuse of dominant position can originate for all market participants. 
Then it was seen that a precise imposition of custom duties might be 
fundamental to avoid the harmful effects that the social dumping practiced outside the 
internal market can originate from an EU competition policy perspective. The 
imposition of custom duties on goods coming from those countries is vital to eliminate 
the unfair advantage that foreign companies have over European companies. 
It was also discussed how the transfer pricing rules currently in force are 
fundamental to ensure fair competition, preventing that certain market participants 
acquire an unfair advantage over their competitors by reducing their tax obligations 
through the allocation of their profits to low tax jurisdictions. 
Fourthly, it was concluded that taxes are an essential tool in making the 
European economy more prosperous, competitive, innovative and efficient, whether it is 
through the stimulation of R&D activities like the patent box regimes or through the 
creation of new jobs.  
It was also noted that environmental taxes can play a key role to avoid the 
harmful effects that the environmental dumping practiced outside the internal market 
may originate from an EU competition policy perspective. Charging environmental 
taxes on goods coming from those countries is essential to eliminate the unfair 
advantage that foreign companies have over European companies. Furthermore, by 
protecting the environment, environmental taxes help to achieve the ultimate purpose of 
competition policy, the society welfare and stimulate (green) innovation. 
Finally, we observed that even though excise duties on alcoholic beverages and 
tobacco are frequently pointed out as having a negative impact, they truly are in line 
with the ultimate purpose of competition policy inasmuch as they correct a market 
failure in accordance with the public interest and for that reason they cannot be 
considered a foe of competition. 
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With the exception of excise duties, all the remaining situations analysed 
throughout this Part show that taxes foster competition, ensure the maintenance of the 
level playing field, protect market participants and correct serious market failures, some 
of the most important goals of competition law. Accordingly, one shall conclude that 
taxes can be a true ally of competition. 
 As a final point, it was stressed how VAT coordination is an excellent example 
that taxation in the internal market does not have to be a synonym of obstacles to 
competition. Tax coordination ensures that European companies compete under more 
homogeneous conditions, which is fundamental to maintain the level playing field in the 
internal market. In the author’s opinion VAT coordination should function as an 
inspiration for the challenges that direct taxation is currently facing, especially corporate 
taxation, which requires an urgent shift. 
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PART IV - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. General Context 
 
In the present Part the author will analyse what should be done to change the 
legal status quo and remove the obstacles that taxes often imply for competition as well 
as stand out their positive impact. 
The analysis made so far shows that even though taxes have the potential to be 
an ally of competition, they are much more often a foe. The negative impact of taxes on 
competition is much more palpable than the positive impact.  
Therefore it is fundamental from a competition policy perspective to correct the 
situations where taxes constitute an obstacle and stand out their positive impact. 
Accordingly, throughout this last Part of the essay, the author will provide some 
recommendations in that sense. 
As discussed previously, the lack of tax coordination in the internal market is the 
main cause for taxes being so distortive. The lack of tax coordination makes European 
firms compete under different tax rules, which significantly affects the level playing 
field. Companies competing in the same single market are treated differently and have 
to support different tax burdens, accordingly to the jurisdiction where they have their 
headquarters established, which turns the competition process really unfair. 
Furthermore, the lack of tax coordination implies heavy financial costs for companies 
exercising economic activities throughout the internal market, which makes European 
firms less efficient and less competitive. For those reasons, the legal status quo asks for 
a shift. 
Tax coordination is the key solution. In order to ensure the maintenance of a 
level playing field in the internal market it is crucial to coordinate certain aspects of 
national tax systems so that European firms can compete under more homogeneous 
conditions. The VAT coordination proves that taxation in the internal market does not 
have to imply distortions of competition. Thus, a high level of tax coordination is the 
solution to correct the obstacles that taxes frequently imply for competition.  
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 There are some initiatives both at European and international level that are in 
line with the necessary shift, namely, the European proposal for a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base and the OECD action plan on BEPS. The advantages 
that each of these initiatives can bring from a competition policy perspective will be 
analysed in the following sections. 
However, these initiatives are not sufficient to tackle all the obstacles that taxes 
create for competition analysed in Part II. For that reason, the author will recommend 
the adoption of additional measures that in his opinion might contribute to correct those 
obstacles. 
Throughout this Part the author will make a critical analysis about what should 
be done to reduce the obstacles that taxes often bring for competition as well as to stand 
out the situations in which taxes act as an ally.  
This Part is finalized with the main conclusions of this essay. 
 
2. Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
 
As was previously noted, it is urgent to reach some tax coordination in the 
internal market to correct the obstacles that taxes frequently create for competition. It is 
well-known that the harmonisation of tax rates will not occur in the near future, due to 
the lack of political willingness that Member States maintain in giving the Union total 
fiscal sovereignty. Nonetheless the harmonisation of tax rates is not the only thing 
necessary to foster fair competition in the internal market. As Terra and Wattel note, 
“[d]ifferences between Member States’ administrative practices may cause serious 
distortions to the conditions of competition within the internal market”.163  
According to what was said in Part II (section 4), administrative rules have a 
significant impact on competition. A company that can meet its tax obligation in a year 
is in clear comparative advantage over its competitors who have to comply with their 
tax obligations in just one month. This is because during this period of one year the first 
company has a certain amount of financial resources that can ensure better market 
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performance than its competitors. Thus, it is crucial to coordinate the administrative and 
accounting practices in the internal market to ensure the maintenance of the level 
playing field. 
Currently there is one proposal on the table that aims to coordinate the 
administrative and accounting rules in the internal market, the Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB).
164
 In the author’s perspective this proposal can 
contribute to correct some of the obstacles that taxes frequently imply for competition 
and for that reason deserves some considerations. 
One of the most important goals of the CCCTB proposal is the creation of one 
single set of tax rules applicable throughout the whole internal market. This single set of 
tax rules can even be materialised into a tax code that coexists with the tax laws of each 
of the Member States.
165
 Thus, the aim of this proposal is independent of the 
harmonisation of tax rates. It relates only with the administrative and accounting rules, 
which is also very important to balance competition in the internal market. Allowing 
European firms the possibility to compete under the same administrative and accounting 
rules is paramount to make competition fairer. Even if tax rates were fully harmonised, 
it would still be necessary to coordinate the administrative and accounting rules to 
achieve fair conditions of competition.  
 
In addition, under the CCCTB proposal groups of companies would be able to 
consolidate the individual tax bases. The consolidated tax base would then be 
apportioned between the different Member States through a formula.
166
 
Thus, the adoption of the CCCTB can bring significant advantages from a 
perspective of competition policy. First and foremost, it would make competition fairer 
because it gives European firms the possibility to compete under the same 
administrative and accounting rules. In order to ensure the maintenance of the level 
playing field it is essential to have homogeneous tax rules applicable throughout the 
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whole internal market. Accordingly, the tax coordination proposed by the CCCTB is 
fundamental to balance competition. 
Additionally, another advantage that the CCCTB would bring from a 
competition policy perspective is that it would facilitate the exercise of economic 
activities in the internal market and consequently increase competition. Under the 
CCCTB, European firms exercising economic activities throughout the internal market 
would only have to deal with one single set of tax rules and one single tax 
administration. Thus, the CCCTB would ease the exercise of economic activities in the 
internal market, meaning that for European firms, particularly SMEs,
167
 there would be 
greater availability to expand their business to other Member States, increasing 
competition in the internal market.
168
 
Therefore, we must conclude that the adoption of the CCCTB would certainly 
contribute to change the legal status quo and remove some of the obstacles that taxes 
imply for competition. The CCCTB would allow achieving some tax coordination in the 
internal market, which is fundamental to make competition fairer. 
The CCCTB would not only ensure that European firms compete under the same 
set of administrative and accounting rules, but would also ease the exercise of economic 
activities throughout the internal market, thus resulting in increased competition and 
more innovation, two of the most important goals of competition policy. For these 
reasons, the author argues that the adoption of this system is essential from a 
competition policy point of view. 
Considering the high value of the CCCTB proposal and because it could be so 
useful to correct some of the obstacles that taxes constitute for competition, one may 
wonder why a directive was not adopted yet. The main justification is the unanimity 
rule. The CCCTB proposal needs to be agreed by all Member States in Council. As this 
is a very sensitive matter no agreement was achieved yet.
169
 Still, as stated by Professor 
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João Sérgio Ribeiro, given the high advantages of adopting this system, there are great 
chances of the CCCTB being successfully implemented.
170
  
 
3. OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
 
Another initiative that seeks to reach a notorious degree of tax coordination and 
therefore might contribute to reduce the obstacles that taxes often constitute to 
competition is the OECD action plan on base erosion and profit shifting. For that 
reason, it also deserves some considerations. 
Recently, the OECD published one action plan that aims to achieve some 
international tax coordination in order to combat the erosion of tax bases and the 
shifting of income.  
According to the action plan, base erosion and profiting shifting occurs when 
companies resort to tax planning and take advantage of the different tax rules across 
jurisdictions in order to reach double non-taxation or less then single taxation. The 
concept of base erosion and profit shifting also includes arrangements that achieve no or 
low taxation by shifting of profits away from jurisdictions where the economic activities 
creating those profits takes place.
171
  
The OECD argues that companies frequently reduce their tax burdens by taking 
advantages of the different rules in national tax systems. As explained in Part II (section 
9), the erosion of tax bases and the shifting of profit illegitimately allow multinational 
companies to reduce their tax burdens, increase their profits and obtain an unfair tax 
advantage over their competitors that adequately fulfil their tax obligations. Therefore, 
the erosion of tax bases and the shifting of income is one huge problem from a 
competition policy perspective that should be tackled. 
In 2012 the G20 leaders declared the necessity to reform the international tax 
rules in order to combat the erosion of tax bases and the shifting of income and also 
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declared support to the OECD efforts. Hence, international tax coordination is currently 
at the top of tax policymakers agenda.  
As the OECD notes, the process of globalisation does not allow that domestic 
policies, including tax policies, be designed in isolation.
172
 Otherwise, gaps and 
loopholes in tax legislations will continue to exist, creating room for double non-
taxation and distortions of competition. For that reason, it is urgent from a competition 
policy perspective to reach international tax coordination. 
Reaching further tax coordination on the digital economy is one of the top 
priorities of the action plan. According to the OECD, the growing importance of digital 
products that can be delivered over the Internet has made much easier for businesses to 
locate many productive activities in locations that are distant from the physical location 
of their customers.
173
 Multinational companies exercising activities in the digital 
economy are presumed to be especially apt at optimising their corporate structures by 
crossing national tax systems, given their strong reliance on the sale of intangibles.
174
 
Accordingly, the OECD action plan sustains that it is vital to coordinate international 
tax rules to ensure that these companies do not evade their taxes and consequently do 
not distort competition. 
The action plan also indicates that countries should adopt measures like design 
new international standards to be adopted in bilateral tax treaties, adopt strict anti-abuse 
provisions, strengthen the CFC rules,
175
 and create one multilateral instrument designed 
to provide an innovative approach to international tax matters.
176
 The purpose of these 
measures is to reduce the loopholes in national tax systems, increase international tax 
cooperation and attain a satisfactory amount of tax coordination, so as to avoid the 
harmful effects caused by base erosion and profit shifting. 
Thus, the action plan suggests significant modifications on the current principles 
of international corporate taxation. But drastic measures are required to change the legal 
status quo. Accordingly, the adoption of those measures can prove to be truly efficient 
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to effectively tackle the erosion of tax bases, the shifting of income and the distortions 
of competition that it originates. 
The OECD action plan let us conclude that it is essential from a perspective of 
competition policy to reach further international tax coordination. Otherwise, certain 
multinational companies, especially the ones exercising activities in the digital 
economy, will continue to resort to complex and artificial tax schemes in order to take 
advantage of loopholes, shift their profits, reduce their tax burdens and acquire an 
advantage over their competitors, distorting competition. The tax coordination 
suggested by the action plan can prove to be truly efficient to tackle the new challenges 
of international tax law. Accordingly, European politicians should remain alert to the 
OECD efforts as they might be really useful to eliminate some of the distortions of 
competition that the tax systems frequently originate. 
 
4. Recommendations 
  
 A proposal must now be made about what should additionally be done to reduce 
the negative impact that taxes have on competition and excel the positive impact.  
 Despite the fact that the CCCTB proposal and the OECD action plan on BEPS 
can bring positive results from a competition policy perspective due to the tax 
coordination that they seek to achieve, unfortunately these initiatives would not suffice 
to correct all the analysed situations where taxes act as a foe of competition. Thus, the 
author will make its own recommendations to correct the obstacles that taxes frequently 
imply for competition. 
These recommendations aim to constitute a set of guidelines that could inspire 
European policymakers. Being an initial approach, this proposal is not exhaustive and is 
opened to additional developments when the political willingness for strong 
commitments is superior. The purpose of these recommendations is to contribute with 
some fundamental orientations that the author believes that can contribute to change the 
legal status quo. 
1. The first and indispensable measure would be the creation of one group of 
experts specifically responsible for finding solutions to reduce the obstacles that taxes 
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create for competition. Previous experiences show that the creation of one group of 
experts in charge for the discussion of specific matters can be a truly proficient 
mechanism to present important results. That was the case of the Primarolo Group
177
, 
the group of experts formed in 1998 to ensure the administration of the Code of 
Conduct for Business Taxation. This group, composed by one tax expert from each 
Member State, was able to reach a notorious degree of convergence on a sensitive 
matter of direct taxation, the combat of harmful tax competition. This was the first time 
that tax policy makers of the EU Member States reached a proper agreement on 
corporate taxation.
178
 The results achieved by this group were remarkable from a tax 
policy perspective. For that reason, the author suggests that the competent European 
institutions should create one group of experts specifically responsible for finding 
adequate solutions to reduce the obstacles that taxes frequently create for competition 
and excel their positive effects. 
 
2. European politicians should refocus the work of the Code of Conduct for 
Business Taxation simultaneously with its application. This Code was adopted in 1998 
as a soft law instrument and established a set of features that allowed define and 
eliminate several harmful tax measures.
179
 Meanwhile in 2001, when Mario Monti 
became the EC Commissioner for Competition, the Code was converted into a hard law 
instrument. Many years have passed since the Code was created and it is not properly 
designed to tackle the new challenges of international tax law. As the OECD notes 
“today the ‘race to the bottom’ often takes less the form of traditional ring-fencing and 
more the form of across the board corporate tax base reductions on particular types of 
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income”.180 Thus, the author suggests that the Code should be redesigned in order to 
make it a more efficient instrument to tackle the new challenges of international tax law 
in particular, the erosion of tax bases and the shifting of income. The OECD action plan 
should obviously be an influence. 
 
3. The harmonisation of the applicable tax rates in the internal market is a measure 
that would represent a major step to balance competition in the internal market, however 
there is still resistance from EU Member States to take that step. Still, in the 
impossibility of fully harmonising the applicable tax rates in the internal market, EU 
Member States should be able to define the minimum and maximum corporate income 
tax rates applicable in the internal market, similarly to what it set in the VAT directives. 
Nowadays a massive gap between corporate income tax rates exists in the internal 
market, varying between 12.5% (applied in Ireland) and 33% (applied in Belgium and 
France). Member States should reach an agreement to reduce this gap, i.e. to reduce this 
discrepancy and make the competitive conditions in the internal market more equitable. 
Member States could define e.g., that the minimum CIT applicable in the internal 
market is 17% and the maximum is 27%. This would not fully take fiscal sovereignty 
from Member States and would significantly reduce the massive gap and disparity of 
tax treatments granted throughout the internal market and consequently balance 
competition.  
 
     If such agreement could be reached and there was still ambition for further 
progress, Member States could additionally agree that over the years, or even decades, 
this gap should be progressively reduced until corporate income tax rates become fully 
harmonised, ensuring thus the maintenance of an adequate level playing field in the 
internal market. 
 
4. The harmonisation of the applicable tax rates would not be sufficient to achieve 
totally fair conditions of competition and even that harmonisation was accomplished, it 
would still be necessary to coordinate the administrative and accounting rules in the 
internal market. For that reason, it is vital to adopt one single set of tax rules applicable 
throughout the internal market, and that is where the CCCTB proposal can prove to be 
really useful. 
                                                          
180
 OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, page 17. 
   
106 
5. A directive or a regulation coordinating the grant of tax benefits throughout the 
internal market must also be adopted to avoid the distortions of competition that tax 
competition between Member States originates. Certain tax benefits escape from the tax 
aid control exercised by the European Commission due to not meeting the four 
characteristics of a state aid (see Part I, section 5.5). Thus, the tax aid control is not 
cannot prevent the harmful effects of tax competition. Consequently, it would be very 
important from a competition policy perspective to have a piece of legislation that 
defines a ceiling of tax benefits for each industry, reducing tax competition between 
Member States. By coordinating the grant of tax benefits in the internal market, it would 
be possible to avoid the harmful effects that tax competition between Member States 
can originate.  
 
      
6. The re-registration process of cars must be also be abolished by all Member 
States. The re-registration process of cars represents a clear violation of the basic EU 
law rules as it hinders the free movement of this good and distorts substantially 
competition, especially, in the automotive industry. The elimination of this process and 
of the payment of the respective tax would allow the automotive industry to fully 
exploit the economies of scale. It is true that the elimination of the re-registration 
process of cars would represent a loss of tax revenues for certain Member States. 
However, this is an indispensable measure from a competition policy perspective. For 
the same reasons, approximation of vehicle taxes should also be encouraged. 
 
7. Even though the European Union already forbids the imposition of custom 
duties on imported products, it would be important to strengthen these rules in a way 
that Member States could not resort to artificial schemes, like the re-registration process 
of cars to impose disguised custom duties and affect competition in the internal market. 
It is fundamental from a competition policy perspective to ensure that the only custom 
duties or charges having an equivalent effect charged in the internal market are the ones 
imposed on goods coming from external countries that practice social and 
environmental dumping. 
 
8. Exit taxation on legal persons should also be redesigned so that it does not 
discriminate companies exiting the home State when compared to companies that stay 
there. This discriminated treatment results in unfair competition. Further, by dissuading 
  107 
European firms to join the jurisdictions that better suit the exercise of their economic 
activities (the host State), exit taxes prevent European companies from fully exploiting 
the advantages of the internal market, making them less competitive. Thus, EU 
policymakers should redesign exit taxes, removing their dissuasive effect, ensuring that 
they do not confer a less favourable treatment to companies exiting the home State 
when compared to companies that stay there, which would simultaneously make 
competition fairer and foster competition in the internal market. 
 
9. The New Horizontal Directive,181 which is supposed to coordinate the 
application of excise duties in the internal market, should be made more stringent. This 
Directive replaced the already referred 1992 Horizontal Directive, though it does not 
establish the maximum tax rates applicable. By not establishing the maximum tax rates, 
the New Horizontal Directive gives room so that distortions of competition continue to 
exist as it is the case that we have previously analysed regarding excise duties on 
gasoline (Part II, section 4). Thus, the author proposes that the New Horizontal 
Directive should be revised and set the maximum tax rates of excise duties applicable in 
the internal market, increasing tax coordination and reducing distortions of competition. 
 
10. The soft law instruments (guidelines, frameworks and notices) used by the 
European Commission to assess the legality of the tax aids granted by the EU Member 
States should be converted into hard law instruments, especially the 1998 Commission 
Notice on fiscal state aid. This is another measure that would contribute to reduce the 
negative impact of tax aids on competition. Such conversion would increase legal 
certainty, giving Member States the possibility to be sure that the tax aids intend to 
grant are in line with the competition policy aims, avoiding situations where they grant 
illegal tax aids. 
 
11. The European institutions should also increase the Member States’ responsibility 
in the grant of tax aids. Heavily fining Member States that grant illegal tax aids would 
certainly reduce the number of situations where Member States unjustifiably grant tax 
aids that distort competition. 
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12. The creation of a sub-division inside the European Commission or even of an 
autonomous with the sole responsibility of controlling the grant of tax aids is another 
measure that can make the tax aid control more efficient and reduce the distortions of 
competition that the grant of tax aids frequently originates. One body specifically 
focused on controlling the grant of tax aids would certainly be more efficient than a 
supranational authority that is responsible for controlling all types of state aid. As we 
have seen, the concept of state aid is so broad that it is very difficult that one single 
institution can effectively control the grant of all types of state aids. Thus, the creation 
of one body specifically responsible for controlling just this type of state aid, tax aid, 
would contribute to make the tax aid control much more efficient and to avoid situations 
where Member States unduly distort competition through tax aids. 
 
13. Additionally, giving more power to the national competition authorities to 
control the grant of tax aids can also help to avoid situations where Member States 
distort competition through the tax system. National competition authorities are more 
easily aware of any change in their national tax system than the European Commission. 
Thus, national competition authorities can give a very useful contribute to make the tax 
aid control more efficient. Accordingly, they should receive more power to collaborate 
with the European Commission in the tax aid control. 
 
14. Last but not least, EU policymakers should agree on the substitution of the 
unanimity rule by the qualified majority voting. It is due to the unanimity rule that the 
internal market is so underdeveloped about tax matters. Under the qualified majority 
voting, which is the rule used under the ordinary legislative procedure, a law is adopted 
once a certain threshold of votes in the Council of Ministers is obtained. This would 
simplify the legislative procedure on tax matters and allow achieving the shift that the 
current legal framework so urgently requires. EU Member States shall not be afraid of 
adopting this measure because, it is important to reinforce, the qualified majority voting 
does not entail the harmonization of taxation in the European Union. It simply 
eliminates the “hidden veto” that each Member State has under the unanimity rule.182  
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 To conclude, the adoption of these measures is crucial to correct the obstacles 
that taxes frequently constitute for competition. Some of these recommendations might 
have a broad scope and be too ambitious, but they only aim to provide some 
fundamental orientations that could guide EU policymakers when the political 
commitment in the EU is superior. It is the author’s belief that the adoption of the 
majority of these recommendations is in the future of European tax law. 
 
5. Final Conclusions 
 
The main conclusion of this essay is evidently that taxes can be a foe and an ally 
of competition. This was the thesis stated and explained in the course of this work by 
means of examples that confirm its truthfulness. 
Throughout this analysis it is possible to conclude that taxes are responsible for 
making competition unfair and for making European companies less competitive and 
less efficient. As situations where taxes promote unfair conditions of competition we 
have seen the harmful effects caused by custom duties, tax aids, the application of 
different tax rules in the internal market, the re-registration process of cars, tax 
competition and the erosion of tax bases and shifting of income. As situations where 
taxes make European companies less competitive and efficient, we have seen the high 
compliance costs that the lack of tax coordination involves as well as the problems 
created by the impossibility of cross-border relief and exit taxation. In all these 
situations taxes act as a foe of competition. 
Nonetheless, it is also evident that taxes can be an ally of competition. Taxes can 
perform a key role in the achievement of some of the most important goals of 
competition policy, namely, fostering competition and innovation, ensure the 
maintenance of the level playing field, the protection of all market participants and the 
correction of market failures in accordance with the public interest. That is the case of 
taxes that foster competition in monopolistic markets, a precise imposition of custom 
duties, tax regimes that promote R&D and innovation (like patent boxes), taxes that 
stimulate the creation of new jobs and environmental taxes. In all these cases taxes act 
as an ally of competition. Furthermore, if tax coordination is achieved, European 
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companies are able to compete under fair conditions, as we have seen through the VAT 
coordination. Thus, one shall conclude that taxes can also be an ally of competition. The 
negative and the positive impact that taxes may have on competition are thus two faces 
of the same coin. 
Finally, although taxes may be an ally of competition, the analysis made shows 
that they are usually a foe rather than an ally. The negative impact of taxes on 
competition is much more perceptible than the positive impact. Thus, it is vital from a 
competition policy perspective to change the legal status quo, by correcting the 
situations where taxes constitute an obstacle to competition and standing out their 
positive impact. The European proposal for a CCCTB as well as the OECD plan on 
BEPS can contribute to change the legal status quo, as they seek to attain a notorious 
degree of tax coordination. Still, that is not enough to correct all the situations where 
taxes act as a foe of competition. In fact, there are more measures that European 
policymakers can adopt to reduce the negative impact of taxes on competition. Their 
adoption though requires a strong political commitment by part of all EU Member 
States, something that will only be proved with time. But if Member States are willing 
to adopt those measures, the obstacles that taxes bring for competition will surely be 
eradicated, making competition fairer, European firms more competitive, the European 
economy more prosperous and ultimately, improving the European citizen welfare, the 
ultimate purpose of EU competition law. 
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